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BRIAN M. MURRAY* 
 The current criminal justice moment is ripe for discus-
sion of first principles. What the criminal law is, what it 
should do, and why society punishes is as relevant as ever as 
communities reconsider the reach of the criminal law and 
forms of punishment like incarceration. One theory recently 
put forth—reconstructivism—purports to offer a descriptive 
and normative theory of the criminal law and punishment 
while critiquing the ills of the American system. It compre-
hends the criminal law and punishment as functional en-
deavors, with the particular goal of restitching or “recon-
structing” the social fabric that crime disrupts. In particu-
lar, reconstructivism is a social theory of the criminal law, 
prioritizing solidarity rather than a moral conception of the 
common good. Drawing from a line of thinkers, from Aristo-
tle to Hegel to Durkheim, reconstructivism claims to be dis-
tinctive and uniquely equipped to explain what the criminal 
law is and what it should do, as opposed to retributivist or 
utilitarian based theories. It claims to more richly account 
for the social effects of punishment that plague the current 
 
 *  Associate Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law. I would 
like to thank Joshua Kleinfeld for his theory of reconstructivism and challenge to 
me to think more about it; Peter Koritansky and Andrew Skotnicki, scholars of 
older versions of retributivist theory, for their exceptional work, which aided the 
comparisons made in this Article; and the work of countless other jurisprudential 
scholars of the criminal law to whom I am indebted for my interest in thinking 
about this topic. All errors in my understanding of these theories are of course my 
own. I would like to thank The Hon. Stephanos Bibas, Rick Garnett, Andrew 
Skotnicki, Marah McLeod, Jon Romberg, Ed Hartnett, Angela Carmella, Michael 
Ambrosio, and participants at the Summer Workshop Series at Seton Hall Law 
School for comments on drafts of this Article. I would also like to thank my wife, 
Katherine, for her continuous support, and my children, Elizabeth, Eleanor, 
George, John, and Lucy for their inspiring curiosity, endless questions, sense of 
wonder, and zealous love for life. 
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system, unlike duty-based theories of retribution and the 
cold instrumentality underlying utilitarian-based punish-
ment that has made criminal justice impersonal and short-
sighted. 
 This Article critiques reconstructivism’s core claims and 
presents an alternative theory of punishment that contains 
insights for the current moment. While reconstructivism cri-
tiques the failures of common punishment theories to ac-
count for the social nature and effects of punishment, it fails 
to account for forms of retributivism that are not deontolog-
ical. In particular, teleological retributivism, or more simply 
phrased, “restorative retributivism,” already contains the 
descriptively and normatively restorative elements present 
in reconstructivism. Its conception of the common good rests 
on the inherently social nature of human affairs and ac-
counts for the solidarity prioritized by reconstructivism. 
Whereas the reconstructivist prioritizes the socially and cul-
turally constituted, the restorative retributivist seeks to em-
phasize shared moral intuitions, which social realities in-
form, but not to the exclusion of other considerations. 
 This distinction has implications for how each theory 
might critique modern criminal law and punishment. For ex-
ample, restorative retributivism would view the expansion of 
the criminal law—both in terms of substance and admin-
istration—skeptically, and the modern approach to punish-
ment—both in theory and its carceral form—as contrary to 
human dignity and too focused on controlling risk rather 
than promoting individual and social flourishing. This cri-
tique, like reconstructivism, has much to offer in the era of 
the carceral state and can help to reorient punishment to the 
broader good. It shifts the focus away from control and risk 
management to dignity and flourishing, leaving room for 
community involvement, humility in judging, and de-crimi-
nalization. In sum, reconstructivism and restorative retribu-
tivism are relatives, and both helpfully emphasize the social 
implications and consequences of the criminal law and pun-
ishment. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine you are sitting in a courtroom during the sentencing 
hearing for a criminal defendant who recently pled guilty to posses-
sion of a controlled substance. You do not know his name and the 
judge only saw him for the first time a few weeks ago during a plea 
hearing that took less than fifteen minutes. You learn that the de-
fendant has a history of substance abuse and has been convicted of 
previous drug crimes and minor property offenses connected to his 
condition.1 While issues relating to the substance of the charge could 
have been defeated at trial, his peers neither saw his face nor heard 
the case.2 The defendant took the plea deal because it was closer to 
a sure bet, although a bet nevertheless, because now here he is wait-
ing to be sentenced by a judge he’s never met or seen in the com-
munity and who has seen her courtroom flooded by countless cases 
like this a week. The judge is no stranger to the epidemic of drug 
 
 1 Of course, this story is far too common given the social realities relating to 
substance abuse and the ever-expanding usage of the criminal law to penalize drug 
use or behavior intertwined with it. 
 2 Jury trials almost never happen in lower-level cases, not to mention any 
cases, and defendants are rarely tried by their peers. See LAURA I. APPLEMAN, 
DEFENDING THE JURY: CRIME, COMMUNITY, AND THE CONSTITUTION 3 (2015); 
WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 39 (2011); 
John Gramlich, Only 2% of Federal Criminal Defendants Go to Trial, and Most 
Who Do Are Found Guilty, PEW RSCH. CTR. (June 11, 2019), https://www.pewre-
search.org/fact-tank/2019/06/11/only-2-of-federal-criminal-defendants-go-to-
trial-and-most-who-do-are-found-guilty/. 
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use pervading her county and the nation at large.3 Cookie cutter sen-
tencing has become inevitable, churned out in the machinery of the 
criminal justice system.4 
Over the course of a decade, the defendant has cycled in and out 
of county jails, receiving little treatment and few moments of short 
and long-term guidance, and some of those programs just seemed to 
perpetuate stigma. Sadly, the story is all too common,5 making as-
sembly-line sentencings even more impersonal6 and reifying some 
of the judge’s instincts about harsh sentencing.7 The sentencing 
guidelines in front of the judge suggest a guideline range.8 They are 
built from risk assessment instruments9 that theoretically seek to 
mitigate potential harm to the community while imprisoning only 
the most dangerous.10 Those guidelines quantify the man in front of 
you and the judge, and the conversation that occurs out loud between 
the prosecutor, defense attorney, and judge focuses almost entirely 
on the potential for more harm.11 It appears that the risk assessment 
will lead to quite the harsh sentence.12 After the suggested period of 
incarceration, a lengthy period of parole awaits, where the funding 
for transition programs will remain small, the obstacles to reentry 
significant, and the opportunities for setbacks persistent.13 The 
whole process seems desensitized, a world of cold, impersonal 
 
 3 See Understanding the Epidemic, CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/drugover-
dose/epidemic/index.html (last visited May 15, 2021); NAZGOL GHANDNOOSH & 
CASEY ANDERSON, OPIOIDS: TREATING AN ILLNESS, ENDING A WAR 7–8, 17 
(2017). 
 4 See STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 19 (2012). 
 5 BIBAS, supra note 4, at 19–20. 
 6 See id. at 19. 
 7 See Erin R. Collins, The Problem of Problem-Solving Courts, 54 UC DAVIS 
L. REV. 1573, 1594 (2021). 
 8 Collins, supra note 7, at 18–19. 
 9 Brandon Garrett & John Monahan, Assessing Risk: The Use of Risk Assess-
ment in Sentencing, JUDICATURE, Summer 2019, https://judicature.duke.edu/arti-
cles/assessing-risk-the-use-of-risk-assessment-in-sentencing/. The usage of risk 
assessment tools during sentencing is frequent. Id. 
 10 See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09(3) (AM. L. NST. PROPOSED 
FINAL DRAFT 2017). 
 11 Collins, supra note 7, at 1616–17. 
 12 Id. at 1594. 
 13 See Fiona Doherty, Obey All Laws and Be Good: Probation and the Mean-
ing of Recidivism, 104 GEO. L.J. 291, 295 (2016). 
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justice, where individuals get lost. And you, as a member of the 
community, are on the sidelines. 
As you watch the judge, questions flood your mind. What is ac-
tually happening here? Should the judge seek to keep the community 
(and the defendant) as safe as possible by preventing future drug 
use? Exact vengeance on behalf of a community or victims (when 
they exist), or punish out of a sense of duty?14 Is communicating that 
wrongdoing has occurred, and that the social norms underlying the 
community persist despite that reality, most important?15 Or should 
the potential for personal development and flourishing, and its rela-
tionship to the common good, drive the decision?16 Can punishment 
restore and do justice? When deciding whether punishing is appro-
priate in these circumstances for this defendant, what form should it 
take and what is the central question being considered? What should 
the question be? Is there a way to simultaneously explain the real 
function of the criminal law and punishment and why they reach 
where they do? Where should they stop? 
When it comes to these questions, which have been addressed 
by countless legal scholars and philosophical thinkers,17 there is a 
newcomer: reconstructivism.18 This theory purportedly accounts for 
the function of criminal law by operating as an explanation of what 
criminal law does and what it should do.19 Its descriptive plus nor-
mative feature is said to offer more than punishment theories linked 
 
 14 Paul H. Robinson, Competing Conceptions of Modern Desert: Vengeful, 
Deontological, and Empirical, 67 CAMBRIDGE L. J. 145, 147–48 (2008). 
 15 See JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 25 
(1988). 
 16 See Joshua Kleinfeld, Reconstructivism: The Place of Criminal Law in Eth-
ical Life, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1485, 1493, 1532 (2016). 
 17 See AXEL HONNETH, THE STRUGGLE FOR RECOGNITION 7–13 (Joel Ander-
son trans., Polity Press 1995) (1992) (discussing varied philosophical opinions on 
subject). Of course, there is no way to catalogue the entirety of these previous 
discussions, which have lasted for millennia, in a law review article. See id. 
 18 See Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1487. Reconstructivism is the synthesis of 
decades of thought put forth by plenty of scholars, whether they labeled them-
selves reconstructivist or not. Id. Newcomer, of course, might be misleading in 
this context. 
 19 See Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1489–90. 
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to retributivism or utilitarianism.20 Reconstructivism claims to 
thread the needle by providing a theoretical rationale for the three 
big concerns of the criminal law: meting out justice, ensuring public 
safety,21 and identifying what is worthy of condemnation.22 Put 
simply, in an era where the line between the civil and criminal is 
graying,23 it attempts to make sense of why the criminal law is dis-
tinctive, and why punishment is necessary and worth it after all.24 
While reconstructivism has components that resemble retribu-
tivism, utilitarianism, and expressivism, it also claims none of these 
at its core.25 Instead, reconstructivism is a socially oriented theory 
of the criminal law and punishment, paying careful attention to pri-
oritizing the “restitching” of the social order in the wake of crime.26 
Its contribution is that it brings a telos back into play, but a peculi-
arly social one, that is especially cognizant of the developing social 
realities that inform culture, which in turn informs law.27 
This has important social implications for the current criminal 
justice moment. The reconstructivist claims to simultaneously jus-
tify the existence of the criminal law and provide a powerful critique 
of the American system’s key features and failures, and one that is 
unique in its emphasis on the social undercurrents of the criminal 
law and why our system fails.28 It offers a theory that attempts to 
make sense of the condemnation that comes with criminal law, and 
judge that same project, both revealing the good and the warts.29 
Where, precisely, when compared to previous theories of pun-
ishment, does reconstructivism fit? Whereas reconstructivism 
 
 20 Id. at 1534–37. This is in contrast to arguments against a comprehensive 
theory of the criminal law and punishment. See Dan M. Kahan, Between Econom-
ics and Sociology: The New Path of Deterrence, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2477, 2487–
88 (1997); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL 
THEORY 5–12 (1999). 
 21 See PETER KARL KORITANSKY, THOMAS AQUINAS AND THE PHILOSOPHY 
OF PUNISHMENT 100 (2012). 
 22 See Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1491–92. 
 23 Jenny Roberts, Gundy and the Civil-Criminal Divide, 17 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. 
L. 207, 207–08 (2019). 
 24 See Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1542–47. 
 25 Id. at 1523–34. 
 26 See id. at 1500, 1529. 
 27 See id. at 1490. 
 28 See id. at 1490, 1494–95. 
 29 See id. at 1490. 
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claims “descriptive” and “normative” independence,30 this Article 
argues that it closely aligns with earlier versions of retributivism that 
are not of the Kantian, deontological variety31 that have been juxta-
posed with reconstructivism. Hence, the core of the reconstructivist 
claim—its connection to teleology and an underlying philosophical 
system32—is timely in that it reintroduces the concept of telos, but 
not one of a kind. Retributivism has a long history before Kant,33 
and that long history contains strands that also contain the core in-
sights of reconstructivism and might even share its critique of mod-
ern criminal justice issues. And earlier forms of retributivism actu-
ally align relatively well with the findings of modern social science 
about shared intuitions of justice.34 The fact that those shared intui-
tions exist meets Cass Sunstein’s standard for the criminal law, 
namely that unless a “plausible foundation in widely shared moral 
commitments”35 exists, due process might be at issue. Frustration 
with the current machinery of criminal justice is widespread,36 and 
many agree that serious reform is in order. 
Put more clearly, while reconstructivism revives the connection 
between teleology and punishment,37 it is not the only theory of pun-
ishment that connects to the idea of telos. Rather, this older form of 
retributivism does the same, understanding punishment as a function 
of the relational nature of human reality that supports the moral 
 
 30 See id. at 1490–91. 
 31 Id. at 1527. 
 32 See id. at 1490. 
 33 See, e.g., Peter Koritansky, Two Theories of Retributive Punishment: Im-
manuel Kant and Thomas Aquinas, 22 HIST. PHIL. Q. 319, 319 (2005). 
 34 Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Intuitions of Justice: Implications for 
Criminal Law and Justice Policy, 81 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 24–32 (2007) (contrasting 
“empirical desert” with vigilantism). For example, the work of Paul Robinson and 
John Darley has repeatedly conveyed how shared intuitions relating to punish-
ment in fact exist. Id. 66–67 These findings have led to a theory of “empirical 
desert” to allow desert as a distributive principle to become more practicable than 
vengeful or deontological theories of desert put forth by thinkers like Kant. See 
id. at 24; Robinson, supra note 14, at 145–46. 
 35 Cass R. Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold? Of Autonomy, Desuetude, 
Sexuality, and Marriage, 2003 SUP. CT. REV. 27, 73 (2003). 
 36 See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW 3–10 (2011); 
BIBAS, supra note 4, at 27; STUNTZ, supra note 2, at 31–36. 
 37 See Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1527. 
862 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:855 
 
order underlying the criminal law.38 Just like reconstructivism, that 
retributivism is about restitching the order that was transgressed by 
a criminal violation.39 That order is both moral and social. More ac-
curately, the social is inherently intertwined with the moral because 
a robust notion of human flourishing, where both are interwoven, 
underlies the idea of punishment.40 It is a relational retributivism 
where desert entails the individual and the social, and by definition 
it is restorative. It is most definitely not the Kantian—or deontolog-
ical41—retributivism that has been harshly criticized for centuries. 
In a word, it is personalist.42 And it predates modern studies that 
link default punishment motives held by community members to no-
tions of moral outrage in addition to the reaffirmation of community 
norms.43 It is a restorative retributivism. 
This Article offers two contributions: a taxonomical critique of 
reconstructivism and the presentation of an alternative form of re-
tributivism that can help crystallize the purposes of the criminal jus-
tice system. It proceeds in four parts. In Part I, it will describe re-
constructivism as presented. This Part does not, and cannot, contain 
all that was presented in Professor Josh Kleinfeld’s introduction of 
reconstructivism in the Harvard Law Review;44 however, it aims to 
highlight the key components he laid out.45 Part II pinpoints the clas-
sifying label given to reconstructivism, paying careful attention to 
the particular type of retributivism juxtaposed with reconstructiv-
ism. Part III will present a different strand of retributivism that is 
premised on teleology rather than deontological ethics. This retrib-
utivism shares the Aristotelian roots of reconstructivism but finds its 
development through ancient and medieval philosophers rather than 
 
 38 See id. at 1526–27. 
 39 See id. at 1538 (acknowledging retributivism’s goals include restitching 
order but concluding reconstructivism accomplishes this goal better). 
 40 See id. at 1493. 
 41 See Koritansky, supra note 33, at 319, 323; Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 
1527. 
 42 See CHRISTIAN SMITH, WHAT IS A PERSON? RETHINKING HUMANITY, 
SOCIAL LIFE, AND THE MORAL GOOD FROM THE PERSON UP 406–08 (2010). 
 43 See John M. Darley et al., Incapacitation and Just Deserts as Motives for 
Punishment, 24 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 659, 677 (2000). 
 44 See Kleinfeld, supra note 16. 
 45 Id. Any errors in understanding reconstructivism are, of course, my own. 
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Hegel.46 Some of those thinkers were informed by religious faith, 
but the theory remains philosophical rather than religious.47 Its in-
fluence on well-known components of criminal law has been 
demonstrated by scholars like James Whitman.48 Its embers remain, 
but its light has been dimmed in a political-legal regime with classi-
cal liberal premises, although its implications have been discussed 
by some recent scholars.49 Most importantly, it is not fundamentally 
deontological, meaning it contains more flexibility in application to 
particular criminal justice issues, and is more aware of the social 
consequences of punishment. That flexibility also makes its practice 
open to locally, democratic administration, allowing communities to 
pursue justice from the ground up without destroying relationships 
forever. These attributes are why it might be called “restorative re-
tributivism,” and why its insights might be helpful given the wide-
spread desire for social justice in the criminal law. 
 
 46 HONNETH, supra note 17, at 7, 11–30. 
 47 See id. at 7. Teleological retributivism has been developed by religious 
thinkers, building from Aristotelian premises. Id.; see Paul Russell, Hume on Re-
sponsibility and Punishment, 20 CAMBRIDGE U. PRESS 539, 545 (1990). 
 48 See James Q. Whitman, The Transition to Modernity, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 84, 85–86 (Markus D. Dubber & Tatjana Horn 
eds., 2014) (arguing that “modern criminal justice” has historical origins in canon 
and Church-inspired medieval law); JAMES Q. WHITMAN, THE ORIGINS OF 
REASONABLE DOUBT: THEOLOGICAL ROOTS OF THE CRIMINAL TRIAL 2–7 (2008); 
see also ANDREW SKOTNICKI, CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 11 
(2008) (tracing historical understanding of retribution, with restorative and pro-
social intentions, as traditional purpose of criminal law); David McIlroy, Christi-
anity, mens rea and the Boundaries of Criminal Liability, in CHRISTIANITY AND 
THE CRIMINAL LAW 117 (2020). 
 49 See KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 69; John M. Finnis, Retribution: Pun-
ishment’s Formative Aim, 44 AM. J. JURIS. 91, 97 (1999); Dan Markel, Are Sham-
ing Punishments Beautifully Retributive? Retributivism and the Implications for 
the Alternative Sanctions Debate, 54 VAND. L. REV. 2157, 2183–84 (2001) (dis-
cussing “confrontational conception” of retribution and its relational nature); Dan 
Markel, Retributive Justice and the Demands of Democratic Citizenship, 1 VA. J. 
CRIM. L. 1, 5, 10 (2012); Andrew Skotnicki, Foundations Once Destroyed: The 
Catholic Church and Criminal Justice, 65 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 792, 792, 796 
(2004); Kyron Huigens, Virtue and Inculpation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1423, 1425 
(1995); Whitman, supra note 48, at 84–96 (describing theological and philosoph-
ical premises in pre-modernity and how they affected development of reasonable 
doubt rule). 
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Part IV compares and contrasts these two theories.50 This com-
parison indicates that reconstructivism might be classified as a 
strand of this retributivism, but one that focuses more on the social 
activities of humans rather than the moral to define the purpose; at 
the very least, they are close relatives.51 Whereas the thinkers at their 
origin52 and some first premises might be different,53 they both end 
up in very similar places when it comes to the question of how pun-
ishment relates to the broader social order.54 The social solidarity 
that reconstructivism prioritizes is, to use Professor Kleinfeld’s 
terms, “embedded” in the concept of desert within restorative retrib-
utivism, which presumes a transcendence to relationships between 
individuals in a community, culminating in a concept of the com-
mon good that recognizes the inextricable connection between the 
social and the moral.55 That social solidarity not only has philosoph-
ical roots in Aristotle’s concepts of eudaimonia and the flourishing 
of the community,56 it has been validated by shared intuitions of 
 
 50 To be clear, I am not the creator of this theory of retributivism. I am merely 
situating it next to reconstructivism to compare their core claims. And as men-
tioned above, I am indebted to several philosophical thinkers who have clearly 
discussed and critiqued it. All errors in my representation of the theory’s devel-
opment and core claims, as well as those scholars’ contributions, are, of course, 
my own. 
 51 See infra Part IV. 
 52 See HONNETH, supra note 17, at 7–30; KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 70. 
Augustine and Thomas Aquinas have very different philosophical systems than 
Hegel, but interestingly, Aquinas and Hegel both acknowledge Aristotelian influ-
ence on their work. See HONNETH, supra note 17, at 7–30; Shawn Floyd, Thomas 
Aquinas: Moral Philosophy, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., https://iep.
utm.edu/aq-moral/; Augustine (354–430 C.E.), INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL, 
https://iep.utm.edu/augustin/. 
 53 See Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1529; Finnis, supra note 49, at 97–99. For 
example, Professor Kleinfeld describes the social emotions, impulses, and prac-
tices that underlie reconstructivism, while John Finnis has described the finite 
goods and practical reason that underlies retributivism. See Kleinfeld, supra note 
16, at 1529; Finnis, supra note 49, at 97–99. 
 54 Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1529. 
 55 Id. at 1492, 1544. 
 56 The closest English word for the Ancient Greek term eudaimonia is prob-
ably “flourishing.” See Ethics Explainer: Eudaimonia, ETHICS CENTRE (Aug. 4, 
2016), https://ethics.org.au/ethics-explainer-eudaimonia/. Or, to use Aristotelian 
terms, the polis. HONNETH, supra note 17, at 7, 11–30; see Kleinfeld, supra note 
16, at 1493 n.11.  
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justice underlying the concept of “empirical desert.”57 The major 
distinction between the two theories seems to be that restorative re-
tributivism has a more static notion of the common good. Arguably, 
that notion is richer given its perceptions beyond the social and em-
pirically verifiable. 
Part V focuses on the upshot of this philosophical classification 
and some of the insights that restorative retributivism can bring to 
current discussions about the criminal justice system. Retributivism, 
while revived over the past several decades, has been under fire for 
centuries as too “mystical” and impractical, and too close to the 
vengeful.58 Concepts of desert are viewed as indecipherable and 
thereby not useful, making risk assessment tools even more appeal-
ing.59 To be fair, vengeful and deontological theories of desert strug-
gle to provide clear responses to social ills connected to punishment. 
Proponents of empirical desert, like Paul Robinson, have fought 
back against the notion that retribution is a concept forever lost, us-
ing modern methods to validate desert as the basis of punishment 
and to convey its practicability.60 Nevertheless, this age is one where 
the language of risk and control pervade discussions of criminal jus-
tice, leading to incapacitation and inequitable outcomes. Recon-
structivism is a response to that trend, emphasizing the social utility 
of the criminal law to construct a powerful critique of the current 
criminal justice moment. 
Part V demonstrates how restorative retributivism does the 
same, but with a richer understanding of purpose that is restorative 
on more than one level. Reconstructivism is arguably more demo-
cratic and less fixed,61 leaving room for development in democratic 
society. But restorative retributivism is more stable given its open-
ness to fixed roots in the natural order, providing the constraints that 
prevent the worst democratic impulses (e.g., incapacitation and in-
carceration run amok, which is currently a huge problem)62 from 
 
 57 Robinson & Darley, supra note 34, at 18. 
 58 See Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1515. 
 59 See Koritansky, supra note 33, at 323–24. 
 60 See Robinson & Darley, supra note 34, at 18–19. 
 61 See Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1552–55. 
 62 Sharon Dolovich, Creating the Permanent Prisoner, in LIFE WITHOUT 
PAROLE: AMERICA’S NEW DEATH PENALTY? 96, 98–100 (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. 
& Austin Sarat eds., 2012). 
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doing injustice and punitive excess, something not necessarily 
barred by reconstructivism itself.63 It also preserves spaces for local 
communities to make decisions, something the current criminal jus-
tice system is poor at accomplishing64 given its well-known slide 
into insider-based decision-making.65 It is synergistic with shared 
notions of punitive justice held by laypersons, making it cognizable 
in the modern day, and potentially disruptive of plea-bargaining 
norms and other streamlined practices that are impersonal. At the 
same time, it relies on the hard work of prudent individuals to im-
plement66—an aspiration most have for government, but a real chal-
lenge given the current moment. In short, restorative retributivism 
would shift the focus of the criminal law and punishment towards 
the question of human flourishing rather than the mitigation of risk 
or efficient social control. 
In the end, reconstructivism and this version of retributivism are 
natural partners in reorienting and enriching debates about the crim-
inal law, and they should be viewed as such as conversations about 
criminal justice reform evolve. They are not that far apart and, at the 
very least, give forceful reason for reflecting on how what binds the 
“social fabric” should always be a focus of criminal justice reform. 
I. WHAT IS RECONSTRUCTIVISM? 
Reconstructivism is a theory of criminal law nestled within so-
ciological philosophy.67 Its philosophical forefather is Hegel, and its 
sociological parent Durkheim.68 Its first principle is that “social 
practices and institutions” are the way they are because of values 
that subsist within them.69 This is the origin of the phrase, the “em-
bodied ethical life,” which holds ethical values are organically 
 
 63 This point was conceded by Professor Kleinfeld in his Article when he rec-
ognized that retributive side constraints might be necessary to prevent reconstruc-
tivism from being too relativistic. See Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1529 n.122. 
 64 See infra Part V (referring to Stuntz’s work on loss of local administration 
of criminal law that allows law to be simultaneously relational and justice-ori-
ented). 
 65 APPLEMAN, supra note 2, at 3. 
 66 See Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1564–65. 
 67 See id. at 1494, 1549, 1556–57. 
 68 See id. at 1487. 
 69 See id. 
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contained within social realities.70 Studying these social practices 
and institutions thereby reveals the normative order already at work, 
allowing for the ability to critique those norms. 
How does this premise relate to the criminal law, or better yet, 
the reconstructive approach to criminal law? Reconstructivism pos-
its that the criminal law and punishment make sense because they 
represent the way that society responds to attacks on the socially 
embodied ethical life within a community.71 In short, punishment 
defends against wrongdoing and reinforces the social fabric under-
lying the normative order, which necessarily entails certain values 
held in common, and developed socially.72 Reconstructivism is thus 
primarily a social theory of criminal law rather than a metaphysical 
or logically ethical one. The utility of the criminal law comes from 
its ability to support social norms.73 Professor Kleinfeld states that: 
[C]riminal law has a distinctive role to play in the 
social world, a function that gives it a different center 
from other areas of law, because criminal law is the 
primary legal institution by which a community re-
constructs the moral basis of its social order, its eth-
ical life, in the wake of an attack on that ethical life.74 
Criminal law protects against wrongdoing that denies the reality of 
the ethically imbued social order.75 The reconstruction of socio-eth-
ical norms transgressed by wrongdoers is the purpose (telos) of the 
criminal law.76 Otherwise the social fabric disintegrates.77 
 
 70 See id. at 1487, 1493. 
 71 See id. at 1486–87. 
 72 Id. at 1488, 1500 (“[T]he function of criminal law has everything to do 
with embodied ethical life.”). 
 73 See id. at 1489. 
 74 Id. 
 75 See id. at 1489, 1529. 
 76 Id. at 1490–91. Professor Kleinfeld uses the metaphor of discipline in a 
classroom to indicate the purpose of the criminal law. Id. at 1506. If violations of 
the professor’s rules go ignored, and unpunished, then the entire social fabric dis-
integrates. See id at 1500. Thus, punishment reiterates the persistence of the order. 
Id. at 1489–91. 
 77 Id. at 1500. 
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The linchpin of that socio-ethical norm is the concept of solidar-
ity.78 This word is extremely significant in reconstructive thinking: 
it emphasizes how punishment’s purpose is to reiterate the shared 
moral culture, because “it is shared, rather than solely because it is 
right . . . .”79 The emphasis on solidarity stems from Hegel and 
Durkheim’s empirical observation that humans are social beings and 
that flourishing was contingent on social realities.80 Importantly, this 
premise did not arise with either of those thinkers; rather, it is fun-
damentally Aristotelian,81 and as will be shown later, that is a key 
premise of restorative retributivism.82 
This social basis means that reconstructivism does not share the 
predominant view83 that punishment is inherently evil, or always a 
form of suffering.84 The corollary is that reconstructivism is not im-
mediately skeptical of state power; better yet, it does not start from 
the premise of limiting the power of the state in the wake of crime.85 
Rather, the first question for the reconstructivist relates to the nature 
of wrongdoing. This attribute is claimed as distinctive86 from typical 
punishment theory: 
[T]he question of how to understand crime is one part 
of a larger question about how to understand wrong-
doing in general. To understand wrongdoing is to 
 
 78 See id. at 1492. 
 79 Id. at 1492. 
 80 See id. at 1493. 
 81 See HONNETH, supra note 17, at 7, 11–30 (describing influence of Aristotle 
on Hegel, and Aristotle’s beliefs that purpose of life was moral flourishing, human 
beings are naturally social, and flourishing therefore requires a polis). 
 82 See infra Part III (noting how scholastic retributivists, such as Thomas 
Aquinas, built from the Aristotelian premise that humans are naturally social and 
political animals). 
 83 See, e.g., JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF 
MORALS AND LEGISLATION 158 (J.H Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1996) (“[A]ll 
punishment is mischief: all punishment in itself is evil.”). 
 84 Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1497–98. 
 85 Id. at 1497 (referencing how retributivism and utilitarianism “give criminal 
theory a libertarian cast”). 
 86 Restorative retributivism shares this trait: it sits within a larger moral 
framework about wrongdoing because of its teleological roots. See Huigens, su-
pra note 49, at 1435. Professor Kleinfeld references how modern retributivists 
care about wrongdoing, but labeling that phenomenon as a late developing interest 
seems mistaken. See Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1497–1504. 
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learn something about the response wrongdoing calls 
for, which in turn implies a position as to what pun-
ishment is and what it is for.87 
This understanding is fundamentally Hegelian, focusing on how 
concepts and ideas manifest in real life.88 “Ideas” are concepts, ac-
tualized.89 
The connection to the criminal law stems from the fact that 
wrongdoing is the attempted de-actualization of the embodied ethi-
cal life, which is an “idea” in the Hegelian sense.90 Wrongdoing 
threatens to re-label the predominant social reality false; hence, 
“[w]rongdoing is communication.”91 This is why reconstructivism 
goes beyond the modern harm principle when contemplating crime 
and punishment:92 wrongdoing causes tangible and intangible harm. 
That intangible harm cuts against the solidarity underlying social 
conditions: “crime is [an] offense to embodied ethical life,” disturb-
ing socially-derived norms to justify condemnation.93 Crime denies 
the socio-moral claims of the law.94 It expresses disdain for the law 
and social order underlying it.95 Failing to respond allows the crime 
to usurp the socio-moral norm, or, as Professor Kleinfeld puts it, 
“[C]rime declares: ‘[t]he norm . . . does not hold.’”96 Because those 
norms are socially derived, crime is thus anti-social.97 For the recon-
structivist, punishment in the wake of crime is pro-social. 
This understanding of wrongdoing has particular implications 
for victims, a development illustrated by Jean Hampton and Jeffrie 
 
 87 Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1498. 
 88 Id. at 1499 (citing G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
RIGHT 25 (H.B. Nisbet trans., Allen W. Wood eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) 
(1821)) (“Philosophy has to do with Ideas and therefore not with what are com-
monly described as mere concepts.’”). 
 89 See id. 
 90 See id. 
 91 Id. at 1504. 
 92 See id. at 1501–02. 
 93 Id. at 1505. 
 94 Id. at 1512. 
 95 Id. at 1529. 
 96 Id. at 1506. 
 97 See id. at 1505–06. 
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Murphy.98 Wrongdoing devalues victims within the prevailing so-
cial order99 and is an intangible harm in the form of an insulting 
degradation of the victim that threatens to de-actualize the norm em-
bodied in the victim.100 In short, it is a comment to destabilize the 
social hierarchy, rejecting the social status of the victim.101 It is a 
rejection of that victim’s actualized social place.102 
Punishment, therefore, reiterates the social reality prior to the 
transgression, reaffirming the “idea,” or the embodied ethical life.103 
Its validity rests in its reaction to how wrongdoing disrupts the social 
norm. Members of the community must respond in order to reiterate 
the social order again.104 It is the counterproposal to the proposal put 
forth by the wrongdoer to undo the social order.105 Punishment, in 
true Hegelian form, is the synthesis after crime’s antithetical nature 
disrupts the thesis within the social order.106 In summary, punish-
ment responds to the “abstract norms or rights and a socially ap-
proved status structure or hierarchy.”107 It thus goes beyond individ-
ual harms, justifying its placement within public law.108 With re-
spect to victims, the connection to publicly validated dignity is thus 
apparent. 
For the reconstructivist then, the goal of punishment is to “re-
construct a violated normative order in the wake of a crime.”109 It is 
expressive, negating crime’s message and declaring the crime 
 
 98 See id. at 1500, 1507–09, 1516. Kleinfeld claims that Hampton and Mur-
phy are reconstructivists. Id. 
 99 Id. at 1529. 
 100 MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra, note 15, at 25, 36–40. It is not clear to me 
why this is not metaphysical given the transcendent nature of human relationships. 
 101 See Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1508 (noting how Murphy and Hampton 
understood effect on victim psychologically, but not as a matter of social status). 
 102 Id. (“[S]ocial status is a socially given thing.”). 
 103 Id. at 1499 (“Punishment, in turn, re-actualizes the right, making it some-
thing ‘fixed and valid’ in the wake of a wrong.”). 
 104 See id. at 1505–06, 1529. As will be described in Part III, this sounds a lot 
like natural law based human inclinations which, a priori, deserve our trust. 
 105 Id. at 1509 (“Society’s response makes the proposal, as a claim about the 
social world, true or false.”). 
 106 See Günther Jakobs, Derecho Penal: Parte General, 18–19 (1995), as re-
printed in LUIS E. CHIESA, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 2.03 (2014). 
 107 Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1509 (emphasis added). 
 108 Id. at 1512. 
 109 Id. at 1513. 
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“untrue” as a social reality.110 To be clear, it does not undo the crime; 
rather, the communicative content of punishment indicates that 
wrongdoing does not represent the way things are or will be.111 In-
terestingly, this makes the reconstructive understanding of punish-
ment fundamentally linguistic and symbolic, providing a “shot in 
the arm” for those obeying the law.112 Accordingly, this makes re-
constructivism less offender-centric, unlike retributivism. 
Thus, reconstructivism contemplates what wrongdoing is, and 
what crime is, before thinking about punishment. To put it in lay-
men’s terms, knowledge of what actually happened (in a socio-
moral sense) must precede punishment in order for the latter to be 
appropriate.113 Criminal law uniquely has the endeavor of helping 
to revive the social order when it is “offend[ed], threaten[ed], and 
undermine[d].”114 Crime tears the social fabric while punishment re-
stitches it.115 Thus, criminalization and punishment are connected, 
built on an ethical order derived from shared social bonds.116 And 
that ethical order has political implications, tethering criminal law 
to broader political philosophy117: 
[T]he nature of criminal wrongdoing is that it vio-
lates and threatens embodied ethical life and the na-
ture of punishment is that it restores and protects em-
bodied ethical life in the wake of the crime. Punish-
ment does so for the sake of social solidarity and be-
cause respect for the society’s normative order and 
the worth of all persons, including both offender and 
victim, demands it.118 
 
 110 Id. 
 111 See id. at 1513–14. 
 112 See id. at 1514–16 (noting how Durkheim understood punishment to re-
store faith of rule followers). 
 113 Id. at 1500 (“One cannot understand punishment as re-actualizing a norm 
unless one first understands crime as de-actualizing the norm.”). 
 114 Id. 
 115 Id. at 1500, 1538. 
 116 Id. at 1502. 
 117 Id. at 1503–04. 
 118 Id. at 1524. 
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For the reconstructivist, the function of criminal law and punishment 
is to forge and re-forge the social order.119 
II. THE RECONSTRUCTIVE CRITIQUE OF RETRIBUTIVISM 
Where does reconstructivism fit within broader legal theories, as 
well as theories of criminal law and punishment? This Part discusses 
how reconstructivism labels retributivism, before taking a deeper 
dive into the type of retributivism used to compare both theories. 
Reconstructivism claims to be the only theory that has some-
thing to say about “embodied ethical life and solidarity . . . neces-
sarily present[ing] a theory of the nature of crime . . . [and] norma-
tive content atop a thick description of social life.”120 The word 
“necessarily” does a lot of work in this description, as Kleinfeld is 
careful to note that reconstructivism could be a “type of retributiv-
ism, utilitarianism, or expressivism.”121 After all, Hegel considered 
himself a retributivist given the fact that punishment “re-actualizes 
the right” that was infringed by wrongdoing.122 But in the end, 
Kleinfeld opts for labeling reconstructivism as its own species, but 
one that simultaneously conflicts with and affirms certain core 
claims of the alternatives.123 
One reason for this classification is that reconstructivism acts in 
the Hegelian fashion described above for instrumental reasons, par-
ticularly to promote human welfare: Punishment “ensures that the 
norms proposed by the wrong do not overtake social life.”124 Pun-
ishment has a function. This sets up a contrast between reconstruc-
tivism and Kantian retributivism, which is the version of retributiv-
ism juxtaposed with reconstructive thought. Whereas the Kantian 
retributivist would execute the murderer on the island as a matter of 
right and obligation (given the violation of the moral rule), the re-
constructivist would, rightly, be concerned that doing so has no 
 
 119 Id. at 1523. 
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. at 1525. 
 122 HEGEL, supra note 88, at 127 (“The cancellation . . . of crime is retribution 
in so far as the latter, by its concept, is an infringement of an infringement.”); 
Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1499. 
 123 See Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1525. 
 124 Id. at 1526–27. 
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instrumental effect on the sociality underlying punishment in the 
first place.125 In other words, island executions cannot possibly con-
tribute to human welfare because there is no function for punishment 
to perform when no community exists to receive the message.126 
Thus, we come to a key attribute of reconstructivism that distin-
guishes it from modern theories of punishment: it is teleological.127 
This contrasts with Kantian deontological ethics underlying the 
criminal law and punishment.128 For Kant, function has no place in 
the analysis of justice; categorical imperatives abound, punishment 
is mandated out of obligation.129 The teleological nature of recon-
structivism stems from its rejection of the default, contemporary 
philosophical posture requiring a “fact/value distinction.”130 For 
Kleinfeld, the descriptive and normative are necessarily intertwined 
in human thought and reality.131 The teleological and functional are, 
therefore, connected; definitions contain standards of evaluation.132 
Once we know what something is, we can assess whether that some-
thing is doing well at what it is.133 
 
 125 See id. at 1527. 
 126 Id. at 1527 (“When society disbands, there is no one left to receive the 
message for which punishment exists.”). 
 127 See id. 
 128 Id. 
 129 Id. 
 130 See id. at 1534–35. 
 131 See id. at 1534–36. As discussed below, this is a position shared with tele-
ological retributivism, which holds that human realities are both factual and moral 
realities, such that total disentanglement is hard to accomplish. 
 132 See id. at 1536. 
 133 See id. at 1536. Kleinfeld describes a house as a structure that gives shelter. 
Id. If the house “does not give shelter, it is a defective house, and if it is defective 
to a sufficiently extreme extent, it might cease to be a house altogether,” becoming 
something like a shack or abandoned structure. Id. Thus, function stems from es-
sence. Id. (citing CHRISTINE M. KORSGAARD, SELF-CONSTITUTION: AGENCY, 
IDENTITY, AND INTEGRITY 32 (2009) (“[E]very object and activity is defined by 
certain standards that are both constitutive of it and normative for it.”)); Hilary 
Putnam, The Entanglement of Fact and Value, in THE COLLAPSE OF THE 
FACT/VALUE DICHOTOMY AND OTHER ESSAYS 28, 30 (2002) (“[N]ormative judg-
ments are essential to the practice of science itself.”); ROBERT B. BRANDOM, 
MAKING IT EXPLICIT: REASONING, REPRESENTING, AND DISCURSIVE 
COMMITMENT 5 (1994) (referencing how social practices provide normative 
force). 
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Whereas retributivism (as presented) focuses on moral wrong-
ness and desert to determine what should be criminalized and how 
punishment should be meted out, reconstructivism looks to “moral 
culture” and the expressive nature of punishment.134 This distinction 
grows from labeling retributivism as exclusively individualistic and 
concerned with imposition of punishment out of duty, suggesting 
retributivist callousness towards the socially devastating effects of 
punishment.135 This understanding of retributivism is fundamentally 
deontological.136 In contrast, reconstructivism takes aim at higher, 
teleological purposes that are socially inspired, which also leaves 
room for pluralistic functionality.137 Reconstructivism is presented 
as having the longer view and de-mystifying the deontological sys-
tem underlying Kantian retributivism: “[W]e have here a similarity 
and a dissimilarity: reconstructivism, like retributivism, sees pun-
ishment as good or right in itself, but unlike retributivism, explains 
that goodness or rightness in terms of human welfare.”138 
Reconstructivism also purports to explain why punishing is re-
quired and why it is useful. Kleinfeld rightly notes how deontologi-
cal retributivism cannot take account of the social consequences of 
punishment, whether good or bad.139 “Reconstructivism can explain 
why punishing Eichmann is an imperative of justice” and is good; 
retributivism cannot.140 In modern terms, retributivism (so the cri-
tique goes) has nothing to offer to the problem of mass incarceration, 
prison conditions, or collateral consequences, for the same rea-
son.141 In sum, reconstructivism offers a communicative theory of 
punishment that reiterates principles that are “morally and 
 
 134 Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1491–92. 
 135 Id. at 1496 (noting how retributivism does not address mass racial incar-
ceration because individual desert is all that matters). The idea that retributivism 
foolishly fails to take account of consequences it knows are likely to ensue has 
been critiqued by Adam Kolber. Adam J. Kolber, The Subjective Experience of 
Punishment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 182, 200–03 (2009). 
 136 See Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1527. 
 137 Id. at 1537. 
 138 Id. at 1527. 
 139 Id. at 1528. “Justice requires that we uphold the principle, and by uphold-
ing it we advance human welfare.” Id. As will be shown below, this is a cardinal 
principle of teleological retributivism. See id.; Mark Tunick, Is Kant a Retributiv-
ist?, 17 HISTORY POL. THOUGHT 60, 67 n.38 (1996). 
 140 Id. 
 141 Id. at 1496. 
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pragmatically essential to social life.”142 The knock on retributivism, 
in contrast, is that it only speaks to the morally required, with no 
consideration of the socio-moral component.143 Retributivism, it is 
said, speaks to condemnation, but not the control-based function of 
the criminal law, or the ripple effects of punishment on the broader 
social fabric.144 
Reconstructivism also purports to have a different focus with re-
spect to human dignity than Kantian retributivism because it prefers 
victims.145 Kantian retributivism disdains instrumental punishment 
because it uses offenders contrary to their dignity and, in a way, ob-
fuscates the notion of accountability underlying punishment and be-
ing conducive to honoring dignity.146 In contrast, “[r]econstructiv-
ism is oriented to the dignity of victims[,]” responding to the social 
degradation caused by wrongdoing.147 According to Kleinfeld, this 
works in reconstructivism’s favor because the deontological retrib-
utive notion that offenders are fully agential is empirically mistaken 
given social conditions that impair judgment.148 Some who violate 
the law are affected by social conditions, and punishment premised 
on baseline equality in freedom, in spite of those social conditions, 
overlooks a key issue in the justice of punishment. Kleinfeld 
acknowledges deep moral complexity here, but claims retributivism 
has no answer given its focus on addressing the act of wrongdoing, 
and nothing else.149 As presented below, restorative retributivism is 
cognizant of this moral nuance.150 
 
 142 Id. at 1528. 
 143 See id. at 1496. 
 144 Id. at 1500, 1542 (“Retributivism . . . speak[s] to one half of the duality.”). 
 145 See id. at 1531. 
 146 Id. at 1528–29. 
 147 Id. at 1529. 
 148 Id. at 1529 (noting how “agential capacities are damaged, and damaged in 
morally complex ways”). Notably, restorative retributivism considers social con-
ditions that affect the ability of the will to choose rightly as mitigating conditions 
for punishment. See id. at 1529–30. 
 149 See id. at 1528–29, 1531. 
 150 Whether human beings can decipher and manage it is, of course, a different 
question. But, whereas Kantian retributivism might wipe its hands and say “what-
ever,” teleological retributivism might have a humbler approach. See SKOTNICKI, 
supra note 49, at 65 (describing pro-social, anti-alienation intentions beyond pen-
itential punishment); Mary Sigler, Humility, Not Doubt: A Reply to Adam Kolber, 
2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 158, 161 (2018). 
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Kleinfeld offers a third distinction between retributivism and re-
constructivism relating to the place of emotions. He claims retribu-
tivists contemplate “condemnatory emotions” as part and parcel of 
the “sense of justice” demanded in the wake of wrongdoing.151 In 
contrast, reconstructivists understand emotion as a socially devel-
oped response to wrongdoing; emotion undergirds punishment be-
cause emotion reflects the social bonds between members of a com-
munity.152 This social origin of punitive emotion is more valid be-
cause it is less vengeful; its sharedness makes it less personal, and 
thereby less susceptible to manipulation because it is bounded by 
the social order itself.153 
In short, reconstructivism might be a relative of retributivism, 
but not a partner. They both hold that justice “demands punishment 
for wrongdoing.”154 But the split centers on functionality; deonto-
logical retributivism is act-centric. In contrast, reconstructivism, 
built from social premises, is cognizant of the broader human wel-
fare, but one that is socially and culturally constituted rather than 
morally abstracted.155 This leaves room for different strands of re-
constructivism across cultures,156 making the reconstructivist “a 
criminal law relativist.”157 The customs of those cultures inform the 
criminal law.158 Its teleological roots are unfixed. They are unfixed 
because the Hegelian roots of reconstructivism contain a “moral 
center” that mandates criminalization of extremely abhorrent behav-
iors contrary to “reason and freedom,”159 while refraining from 
 
 151 Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1530. 
 152 Id. 
 153 See id. 
 154 Id. at 1531. 
 155 See id. at 1530–31. 
 156 Id. at 1549 (“[R]econstructivism . . . accepts a kind of cultural relativism 
with respect to criminal law.”). 
 157 Id. at 1557. 
 158 Id. at 1552-55. This is why Kleinfeld connects reconstructivism to Burkean 
conservative thought and labels it democratic: “The state in the criminal context 
should be the embodiment and protector of society’s lived moral culture – its way 
of life. Edmund Burke would approve. If Burke were a criminal theorist, he would 
be a reconstructivist.” Id. at 1543, 1555. 
 159 Id. at 1560. This moral center is fundamentally Hegelian in its relation to 
the primacy of “reason and freedom.” See id. Which specific practices lie within 
this moral center is not entirely clear. 
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having the criminal law reach every vice.160 Reconstructivism also 
cares more about victim dignity than that of offenders, although it 
concedes that retributive side-constraints might be necessary to fully 
protect offender dignity.161 In the end, reconstructivism is “pro-so-
cial” given that its usage of emotions has solidaristic roots rather 
than abstract moral notions of desert.162 It is a socially restorative 
theory of the criminal law, built from descriptive-normative prem-
ises.163 
III. RESTORATIVE RETRIBUTIVISM 
As mentioned in the preceding parts, there are many versions of 
retributivism.164 This Part argues that examination of non-deonto-
logical—or teleologically-minded retributivism with Aristotelian 
roots—indicates that reconstructivism is not the only route for those 
who view the criminal law as instrumental when it comes to social 
welfare. In fact, restorative retributivism shares many of the traits of 
reconstructivism, and arguably is its parent.165 At the very least, it is 
a theory that has its own conception of wrongdoing that precedes the 
nature of punishment, and it is cognizant of the broader social effects 
of punishment in practice. 
A. The Roots of Restorative Retributivism 
Like reconstructivism, restorative retributivism presupposes a 
moral framework and understanding of political philosophy.166 
 
 160 Id. (“Because reconstructivism highly values embodied ethical life, . . . the 
theory does not see every objectionable social practice as abhorrent.”). Interest-
ingly, this resembles the limits of human law. Richard W. Garnett, Attempts, Com-
plicity, Virtue, and the Limits of Law, in CHRISTIANITY AND CRIMINAL LAW 238–
39, 247, 249 (Norman Doe et al. eds., 2020). 
 161 See Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1499, 1528–29. This suggests that recon-
structivism is not the fully relational theory of criminal law that it presents itself 
to be, which is a point expanded upon in Part IV. See infra Part IV. 
 162 As will be shown in this Part, this comparison is entirely contingent on the 
ruling out of a teleology underlying retributivism. See infra Part III. But if the 
telos for human life intrinsically contains social affairs, then retributivism looks 
as pro-social, if not more, than reconstructivism. See id. 
 163 See infra Part III. 
 164 See supra Part I. 
 165 See infra Part IV. 
 166 See Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1487, 1503, 1522–23. 
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Aristotle is its most well-known philosophical forefather, with me-
dieval thinkers developing his theories.167 The shared link to Aris-
totle means this version of retributivism shares roots with recon-
structivism.168 
The moral and political thought underlying this retributivism is 
fundamentally teleological, building from Aristotle’s concept of eu-
daimonia.169 Teleology underlies the moral concepts within this 
thought and the meaning of political society.170 These understand-
ings contrast sharply with a deontological retributivist like Kant, and 
modern retributivists, who operate from individualistic and classi-
cally liberal premises that also accept the fact/value distinction.171 
In contrast, eudaimonia is an inherently social concept, and what is 
informs what should be.172 In the words of one scholar, it “requires 
an extended concern for friends and for others in the political com-
munity because only that sort of concern will lead to a full develop-
ment of one’s capacities and potential as a human being.”173 
Aristotelian teleology holds that happiness (eudaimonia) is the 
end of all human actions and the reference point from which the 
 
 167 See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? 89–
90 (1988); CHRISTOPHER DAWSON, RELIGION AND THE RISE OF WESTERN 
CULTURE 140-217 (1991) (describing Aristotelian influence in Middle Ages). 
 168 See MACINTYRE, supra note 167, at 89–90; DAWSON, supra note 167, at 
140-217 (1991); Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1486, 1491; Zachary Hoskins, The 
Moral Permissibility of Punishment, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., 
https://iep.utm.edu/m-p-puni/. 
 169 See ARISTOTLE’S “NICOMACHEAN ETHICS” 33–52 (David Fernbach trans., 
Otfried Hoffe et al. ed., 2010); KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 69–70; Ethics Ex-
plainer: Eudaimonia, supra note 56. 
 170 Some might label this conception of retributivism as “aretaic” as it accords 
with virtue ethics. See, e.g., Kyron Huigens, On Aristotelian Criminal Law: A 
Reply to Duff, 18 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 465, 468–69 (2004) 
[hereinafter A Reply to Duff]; Huigens, supra note 49, at 1425. (“The law has a 
purpose, an end in view, which is to promote the greater good of humanity. The 
criminal law serves that end by promoting virtue.”). 
 171 KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 69–70; Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1534–
36. 
 172 KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 70, 85–86 n.36; Ethics Explainer: Eudai-
monia, supra note 56. 
 173 Huigens, supra note 49, at 1445 (citing TERENCE H. IRWIN, ARISTOTLE’S 
FIRST PRINCIPLES 393–406 (1988)). 
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goodness of actions should be determined.174 In other words, the de-
scriptive reality of seeking happiness indicates a normative value by 
which to evaluate the pursuit of that goal.175 And that goal is not 
subjective; instead, it is objective and connected with moral and so-
cial realities. Why social realities? Because human beings are natu-
rally social beings.176 That is a cardinal principle of Aristotelian phi-
losophy.177 The social is contained within the moral significance of 
actions. How do we know that happiness has social roots? The act 
most capable of producing happiness—contemplation of God—is 
rational and social because the subject of contemplation is Being (or 
person in the Christianized version presented later by Scholastic 
Christian thinkers); thus, contemplation presumes a relationship.178 
Thus, the teleology underlying restorative retributivism leaves room 
for the social within the moral. 
As happiness is the end of all actions, those actions are evaluated 
according to how they “contribute to [that] ultimate purpose.”179 But 
happiness, as understood in this system, is not subjective.180 While 
subjective considerations can inform the effect of an action, there 
are some actions that are contrary to happiness altogether.181 How 
the object of an act comports with the goal of life is how that act is 
judged.182 This is one reason why punishment is not viewed as 
 
 174 See THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, pt. I of pt. II, question 1, art. 
7 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., Benziger Bros. ed. 1947) 
[hereinafter SUMMA THEOLOGICA]. 
 175 See id. 
 176 Id. at pt. I of pt. II, question 61, art. 5. 
 177 See ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE 1253a7 (Peter L. Phillips 
Simpson trans., Univ. N.C. Press 1997) (c. 350 B.C.E). 
 178 See ARISTOTLE’S “NICOMACHEAN ETHICS”, supra note 169, at 207 (de-
scribing contemplation as highest pursuit of happiness); SUMMA THEOLOGICA, 
supra note 174, at pt. I of pt. II, question 2, art. 8. 
 179 KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 72. 
 180 Id. at 83. 
 181 See id. at 72, 76. This resembles the Hegelian moral center referenced by 
Professor Kleinfeld when discussing the content and limits of the criminal law, 
although its content is different given other first principles. Kleinfeld, supra note 
16, at 1489 n.2, 1499 n.27, 1543. 
 182 This is one reason why the underlying moral philosophy remains teleolog-
ical rather than deontological. See Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1527. For example, 
a prohibition on lying derives from the fact that lying hinders the liar’s ability to 
develop character. See id. at 76. 
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fundamentally evil in this tradition, although it is not viewed as nec-
essarily good.183 The margin of its contribution to the good is situa-
tional. 
The objective nature of happiness stems from an order that exists 
eternally.184 Human beings apprehend this end by virtue of their ca-
pacity to reason—their existence as “rational agents” who are delib-
erative.185 That capacity is naturally ordered—personally and so-
cially—and is the “rule and measure” of human behavior and the 
basis of morality and politics.186 Observable and experienced human 
inclinations and practices inform this idea.187 These principles cut 
against a relativistic moral framework, although they are cognizant 
of social realities in their application.188 Following natural inclina-
tions in accordance with the object of happiness constitutes the 
moral life.189 This has individual and social implications: a 
“properly functioning human being” or community makes choices 
that comport with the “inherent purposiveness in those inclinations 
fundamental to human nature.”190 Humans are more than the sum 
total of choices or acts, or the expressions of their freedom; they are 
an integrated whole necessarily tethered to societal givens and free-
dom serves the good.191 This position counters the fact/value 
 
 183 SUMMA THEOLOGICA, supra note 174, at pt. I, question 48, art. 6. 
 184 Id. at pt. I of pt. II, question 91, art. 1 (“Aquinas understands this to be the 
“eternal law.”). Of course, Aquinas’ formulation is theologically informed. See 
Floyd, supra note 52. Aristotle recognizes this order as fundamentally part of re-
ality. Huigens, supra note 49, at 1447. 
 185 Huigens, supra note 49, at 1447. 
 186 KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 80–81. 
 187 Id. (“Simply stated, the natural law guides human beings through their fun-
damental inclinations toward the natural perfection that God, the author of the 
natural law, intends for them.”). 
 188 See Manuel Velasquez et al., Ethical Relativism, MARKKULA CTR. 
APPLIED ETHICS (Aug. 1, 1992), https://www.scu.edu/ethics/ethics-resources/eth-
ical-decision-making/ethical-relativism/. 
 189 SUMMA THEOLOGICA, supra note 174, at pt. I of pt. II, question 94, art. 2 
(referencing the connection between natural inclinations and the natural law as 
“reason”). 
 190 KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 84. 
 191 Huigens gives an analogy: 
My horse has the ability to direct himself to cause external 
events; he can act, in our modern, limited sense, voluntarily. 
What he lacks, however, is the ability to conceive of himself as 
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distinction because what should be intrinsically exists with what 
is.192 Human identity is inextricably tied to the social.193 Thus, 
awareness and knowledge of what is generally, and what the crimi-
nal law is and does, can allow for understanding something like the 
purpose of punishment, and provide the grounds for critiquing a sys-
tem that is in place. The criminal law and punishment, like the be-
ings they purport to serve, subsist within a whole. 
This teleological framework thus leaves room for an assessment 
of function, and one cognizant of broader human welfare. Punish-
ment is thus connected to a robust conception of the common good 
that consists of “justice, law, friendship, the dignity of [humans], 
and fraternal love.”194 As Peter Koritansky notes, this framework 
critiques Kantian ethics by pointing to how that system “separates 
morality from the ultimate good for man.”195 Thus, the philosophical 
system within which restorative retributivism resides—or to use 
Professor Kleinfeld’s terminology, is “nestled”—takes stock of the 
broader social good.196 Functionality is baked into the telos under-
lying restorative retributivism.197 
Specifically, this approach holds that social relationships, com-
munities, and societies are fundamentally natural and a constituent 
element of measuring human action.198 This is in direct contrast to 
 
persisting through time, or as being possessed of certain capac-
ities that can be developed to a greater or lesser extent, or as a 
member of a society, or as having a final good that depends on 
all of these things and more. My horse, in short, lacks the ability 
to shape a life into a satisfying and adequate whole.  
Huigens, supra note 49, at 1447–48. 
 192 KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 85; Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1534–36. 
 193 See KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 84, 90. 
 194 Lee J. Strang, The Role of the Common Good in Legal and Constitutional 
Interpretation, 3 U. ST. THOMAS. L.J. 48, 55 (2005). 
 195 KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 85. 
 196 Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1549, 1556–57; Huigens, supra note 49, at 
1426 (“[T]he criminal law cannot avoid the question of the good.”); A Reply to 
Duff, supra note 170, at 485 (noting how the features of a theory of punishment 
are the assumptions, arguments, and ethics upon which the theory draws). 
 197 See Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1491, 1522–23. 
 198 See THOMAS AQUINAS, COMMENTARY ON ARISTOTLE’S POLITICS 18 (Rich-
ard J. Regan trans., 2007). Koritansky describes how his view of Aquinas on this 
point differs from contemporary philosophers like John Finnis. KORITANSKY, 
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Kantian and classical liberal systems that contemplate human soci-
eties as ventures in social contract with otherwise atomistic individ-
uals.199 The distinction makes all the difference for the institution of 
punishment. That is because political society has the capacity to aid 
the moral well-being of individuals and itself.200 Political commu-
nity, by virtue of being social, illustrates the connection between the 
moral and the social.201 The function of a community is to help in-
dividuals live well.202 And the function of law is to promote the com-
mon good.203 After all, the definition of law offered by those who 
developed Aristotelian thought is that law is a rule of reason, prom-
ulgated by a legitimate authority, ordered toward the common 
good.204 Thus, punishment necessarily has a social component and 
necessarily must be cognizant of the common good. The criminal 
law is “purposive.”205 This thinking lays the groundwork for a re-
storative retributivism that is aware of social consequences rather 
than turning a blind eye to the consequences of punishment. 
B. Restorative Retributivism and Punishment 
Restorative retributivism holds that punishment is simultane-
ously bad and good because it is a type of harm suffered by rational 
 
supra note 21, at 88–89, 93–94. Whereas Koritansky’s reading attributes the idea 
that societies are natural to Aquinas, resembling Professor Kleinfeld’s observation 
that social realities are “socially given,” Finnis’ view seems to be that human be-
ings construct communities for “instrumental” purposes, but built from certain 
inherent goods. KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 87 n.39, 89, 91–94; Kleinfeld, 
supra note 16, at 1508, 1518 Even if Finnis’ view is the right one, it would seem 
to move teleological retributivism even closer to reconstructivism, given the re-
constructivist emphasis on human participation in forming social realities. See 
KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 87 n.39, 89, 90–93. 
 199 See KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 68–69, 85. 
 200 JACQUES MARITAIN, THE PERSON AND THE COMMON GOOD 29 (1st paper-
back ed.1966) (“Because the common good is the human common good, it in-
cludes . . . the service of the human person.”). 
 201 See id.; KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 90. 
 202 KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 90. 
 203 Id. at 97 (“[T]he virtue of legal justice is primarily directed to the common 
good to a political community.”). 
 204 See SUMMA THEOLOGICA, supra note 174, at pt. I of pt. II, question 90, art. 
2; ARISTOTLE’S “NICOMACHEAN ETHICS”, supra note 169, at 83. 
 205 Strang, supra note 194, at 194 (noting how law is a “purposive instru-
ment”). 
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creatures against their will but is also necessary to restore order.206 
It is thus concerned “not only with responsibility,” but with making 
both the person punished and society better.207 Punishment thus 
aims to “restor[e] . . . the equality of justice.”208 By its orientation to 
an order of justice, punishment has a function. 
This theory of punishment recognizes a communicative compo-
nent as well. Punishment communicates by (1) restoring order; (2) 
reaffirming that the act was wrong; (3) promoting future compli-
ance; (4) redressing the hurt caused to victim(s); and (5) acknowl-
edging the responsibility and value of the offender.209 
Criminal punishment is permitted only in the wake of crime, and 
crime presupposes wrongdoing. Thus, teleological retributivism has 
an understanding of the nature of crime and wrongdoing that pre-
cedes punishment. Fault is a precondition for criminal punish-
ment.210 Punishment can simultaneously be experienced as an evil 
by the one suffering it and a good “from the point of view of the 
institution inflicting it.”211 
The moral basis for punishment rests in the natural inclinations 
constituted within individuals and social communities permeated by 
a natural, social order.212 Thus, the “natural inclination to punish” is 
about the common good rather than private vengeance or some 
 
 206 See SUMMA THEOLOGICA, supra note 174, at pt. I, question 48, art. 5; 
THOMAS AQUINAS, ON EVIL 75–79 (Brian Davies ed. Richard Regan trans., 
2003); AUGUSTINE, On the Free Choice of the Will, in ON THE FREE CHOICE OF 
THE WILL, ON GRACE AND FREE CHOICE, AND OTHER WRITINGS 3–4 (Peter King 
ed. & trans, 2010). 
 207 Huigens says it this way: “We are concerned here not only with responsi-
bility, but also with virtue.” Huigens, supra note 49, at 1449. A full development 
of how punishment can help to develop virtue is beyond the scope of this Article. 
Professor Huigens has argued that such a connection can exist. See Huigens, supra 
note 49, at 1449. Andrew Skotnicki has argued that Augustine and Thomas Aqui-
nas developed this idea. See Skotnicki, supra note 49, at 796 n.16, 797 (referenc-
ing Thomistic anthropology that allows for the development of virtues). 
 208 KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 105. 
 209 See infra notes 126–130. 
 210 See Antony Duff & Andrew von Hirsch, Responsibility, Retribution and 
the “Voluntary”: A Response to Williams, 56 CAMBRIDGE U. PRESS 103, 105–06 
(1997). 
 211 KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 109. 
 212 SUMMA THEOLOGICA, supra note 174, at pt. I of pt. II, question 87, art. 1 
(“[W]hoever sins, commits an offence against an order: wherefore he is put down, 
in consequence, by that same order, which repression is punishment.”). 
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deontological command.213 Threats to the common good must be 
addressed, lest the common good, and the shared inclinations upon 
which it rests, be undermined.214 These inclinations are not to be 
confused with vengeance.215 Rather, they are tethered to the nature 
of things, particularly the nature of human beings as “rational 
agents” and their experienced reality.216 They also form the basis for 
boundaries that limit punishment.217 They are the moral center un-
derlying punishment.218 
How is this different from Kantian retributivism or modern-day 
retributivism? Teleological retributivism views desert as corre-
sponding to the degree of transgression of the “order of . . . justice.” 
219 It focuses on the harm that has occurred, the nature of the offense, 
the blameworthiness of the offender,220 and their connection to 
 
 213 See KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 110. 
 214 KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 110 (“[S]o also the natural inclination to 
punish criminals directs us to preserving the common good by retaliating against 
those who threaten it.”). 
 215 See Kyron Huigens, On Commonplace Punishment Theory, 2005 U. CHI. 
L.F. 437, 441 (2005) (referencing how deontological retribution, while influential, 
has never been dominant and that retribution has been “chronically misconstrued 
as vengeance”). 
 216 Huigens, supra note 49, at 1447. This is a really important point, and one 
perhaps confusing to the modern retributivist or utilitarian. Aquinas holds that 
“fundamental natural inclinations and the natural goods they cause us to desire 
are to be trusted.” KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 121. 
 217 Id. at 112 (“[A]nger becomes sinful when it desires the punishment of ‘one 
who has not deserved it, or beyond his deserts, or again contrary to the order pre-
scribed by law, or not for the . . . maintaining of justice and the correction of de-
faults.”) (quoting SUMMA THEOLOGICA, supra note 174, at pt. II of pt. II, question 
158, art. 2); see also SUMMA THEOLOGICA, supra note 174, at pt. I of pt. II, ques-
tion 46, art. 6 (referencing how anger is connected to desire for justice, in contrast 
to hatred). 
 218 See id. at 128–29. 
 219 SUMMA THEOLOGICA, supra note 174, at pt. I of pt. II, question 87, art. 6 
(“[T]he act of sin makes man deserving of punishment, in so far as he transgresses 
the order of divine justice, to which he cannot return except he pay some sort of 
penal compensation, which restores him to the equality of justice . . . This resto-
ration of the equality of justice by penal compensation is also to be observed in 
injuries done to one’s fellow men.”). 
 220 A focus on blameworthiness is not an exclusively philosophical concept. 
See J.M.B. CRAWFORD & J.F. QUINN, THE CHRISTIAN FOUNDATIONS OF 
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY OF LEGAL REASONING 1–3 
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norms tethered to the common good.221 This content of desert is how 
this version of retributivism is simultaneously formed and flexible. 
Philosophical reasoning informs the first two attributes (harm and 
the nature of the offense); social facts and natural inclinations (or 
community sensibilities that are shared) inform the latter two attrib-
utes.222 This is why it is simultaneously retributive and restorative. 
Punishment is both reactive—required by wrongdoing to set 
things right—and functional—to repair.223 One medieval thinker 
noted that punishment is like “medicine . . . healing the past sin, but 
also preserving from future sin, or conducing to some good.”224 
Thus, punishment has a restorative character and preventive charac-
ter, but the functional considerations are byproducts of the required 
desert. Punishment is therefore individually tailored and socially 
oriented. 
The restorative character of punishment within restorative re-
tributivism deserves more explanation. What precisely allows pun-
ishment to be restorative? First, punishment responds to an “overin-
dulgent will” on the part of the offender.225 The offender attempts to 
violate the order of justice by rejecting it. That is bad on two counts: 
one for the community and one for the offender. Punishment, there-
fore, is justified in part by its intrinsic relationship to an “order” 
within which humans reside together.226 Accordingly, punishment 
serves as a correction to reset the order that was transgressed. 
But lest one think that this resembles Kantian individualism, in 
reality, the correction is geared towards more than the individual 
will of the offender; rather, it is designed to address the “inequality 
 
(1991); Mitchell N. Berman, Introduction: Punishment and Calpability, 9 OHIO 
J. CRIM. L 441, 443–44 (2021). Christian moral teaching has emphasized it for 
centuries. See id.. 
 221 See Strang, supra note 194, at 55. 
 222 See KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 110. Huigens puts it this way: “[T]he 
criminal law operates on the basis of thick norms: detailed, context-specific pro-
hibitions that have an organic relationship to human history and the human situa-
tion, and that are cognate with moral norms.” A Reply to Duff, supra note 170, at 
498. 
 223 See KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 105. 
 224 SUMMA THEOLOGICA, supra note 174, at pt. I of pt. II, question 108, art. 4. 
 225 KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 105. 
 226 Huigens, supra note 49, at 1456 (“The ends one ought to have is the special 
concern of the criminal law.”); KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 135. 
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that comes about as a result of the crime.”227 Thus, punishment is 
simultaneously offender and order centric, cognizant of a particular 
individual’s relation to and violation of that order. As Koritansky 
puts it: “When a kidnapper is deprived of his freedom by being im-
prisoned, the harm he suffers against his will balances his willful 
transgression of the law and assault upon on the common good.”228 
In other words, within this form of retributivism, punishment has an 
expressive component by addressing the defect from which society 
suffers by virtue of the individual’s action.229 But that expressive 
component stems from the retributive nature of punishment to 
start230—the purpose being the correction of the order that was at-
tacked by individual wrongdoing. That is a good related to the com-
mon good: “[t]he punishment . . . expresses and reaffirms the polit-
ical community’s indignation at the crime committed and solders 
that commitment in the minds of potential criminals whose moral 
future still lay undetermined.”231 There is purpose behind the pun-
ishment, including denouncing the act, reiterating the moral or-
der,232 and pushing the individual to something better.233 
That contrasts sharply with Kantian retributivism that views 
punishment as an obligation, irrespective of purpose.234 Punishment 
is mandatory regardless of its relation to the good; the obligation to 
punish comes from the violation of a universal maxim.235 Hence, the 
bloodlust on the island makes sense because there is no principle 
guiding the exaction of punishment; there is only a command to do 
it. Thus, the Kantian retributivist loses sight of the social conse-
quences of punishment or really any notion of human goods. 
Another way teleological retributivism differs is with respect to 
the famous Kantian lex talionis, which has been criticized as 
 
 227 Id. at 124. 
 228 Id. 
 229 See JOHN FINNIS, AQUINAS: MORAL, POLITICAL, AND LEGAL THEORY 213–
14 (1998) (discussing how crime and wrongdoing offend the common good). 
 230 KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 109–10. 
 231 KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 162. 
 232 SUMMA THEOLOGICA, supra note 174, at pt. I of pt. II, question 87, art. 6. 
 233 See KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 161. 
 234 Id. at 125. 
 235 Id. at 125, 127 (“For Kant, punishment is not, strictly speaking, a good to 
be pursued. It is simply right or just.”). 
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justifying horrific punishment practices.236 The idea that punish-
ment should be exacted in the same form as the crime itself seems 
barbaric, not to mention impossible to carry out for certain types of 
crimes. All of this stems from the Kantian obsession with addressing 
the act that violated universal maxims.237 Further, as many have said 
before, deontological retributivism suffers from an abstraction and 
application problem: many moral philosophers disagree on the 
quantity of desert required, thereby rendering such a system imprac-
ticable.238 But teleological retributivism need not suffer this fate. 
Because the focus is the overindulgent will, how it violated the or-
der, and the quality of that violation, rather than the sheer nature of 
the act, punishment can be meted out in different ways. What mat-
ters for the calculation of desert is the seriousness of the crime and 
the offender’s culpability as it has impaired the common good, and 
the degree of punishment should correspond to what is necessary to 
restore the order of equality that existed before the crime.239 
“Deservingness” is grounded in a notion of the common good, 
naturally and socially informed, and mindful that equality is neces-
sarily linked to justice.240 To be fair, restorative retributivism is traf-
ficking in non-empirical knowledge here. But punishment relates to 
the moral integrity of the political community, and the natural and 
social realities within that community inform that moral fabric.241 
Those realities are not entirely quantifiable. But interestingly, this 
philosophical commitment jives with modern research that has de-
tected how communities and individuals can comprehend moral nu-
ance when it comes to deserved punishment.242 The forefathers of 
 
 236 See id. at 130. 
 237 See id. 
 238 Chad Flanders, Retribution and Reform, 70 MD. L. REV. 87, 100 n.79 
(2010). 
 239 See KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 131 n.46 (referencing how Aquinas 
emphasizes culpability when identifying degree of desert). 
 240 See Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1526. 
 241 See KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 159. 
 242 See Paul H. Robinson & Robert Kurzban, Concordance and Conflict in 
Intuitions of Justice, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1829, 1832–80 (2007) (summarizing re-
search); see also Alexis M. Durham III, Public Opinion Regarding Sentences for 
Crime: Does It Exist?, 21 J. CRIM. JUST. 1, 2 (1993) (“Virtually without exception, 
citizens seem able to assign highly specific sentences for highly specific events.”); 
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restorative retributivism and the proponents of empirical desert are 
certainly not one and the same; nevertheless, the findings of those 
in support of empirically based notions of desert complement the 
premise of teleological retributivism that human inclinations about 
punishment are discernible, shared, and can inform the measure of 
punishment. 
C. Restorative Retributivism and Human Law 
While restorative retributivism presumes a natural order that 
punishment should conform to,243 what does that mean for human 
law? Because this form of retributivism is a theory of criminal law 
within a broader moral framework, it is important to realize the con-
ception of law within that framework. For a teleological retributiv-
ist, human law is necessary given the under-determinate nature of 
the natural law. Humans thus become partners in constructing the 
order of justice, making “particular determination[s] of certain mat-
ters.”244 
This is an important point that certainly distinguishes teleologi-
cal retributivism from something like the lex talionis system pro-
posed by Kant.245 While punishment necessarily follows from the 
order of justice, the system leaves room for human beings to deter-
mine the mode of punishment. Human beings making that assess-
ment, of course, should be simultaneously mindful of the order of 
justice and concrete realities within a particular political commu-
nity.246 Thus, we reach another way that restorative retributivism 
 
Robinson & Darley, supra note 34, at 35–36 (“The conclusion suggested by the 
empirical evidence is that people take account of a wide variety of factors and 
often give them quite different effect in different situations. That is, people’s in-
tuitions of justice are not vague or simplistic, as claimed, but rather quite sophis-
ticated and complex.”). This can be compared with the focus of scholars within 
the Aristotelian tradition, such as John Finnis, who focused on the reality that 
human beings share an interest in certain finite goods. See JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL 
LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 64–69, 100–126 (1980) [hereinafter NATURAL LAW 
AND NATURAL RIGHTS]. 
 243 KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 169.  
 244 SUMMA THEOLOGICA, supra note 174, at pt. I of pt. II, question 91, art. 3. 
 245 KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 164. 
 246 Robinson & Darley, supra note 34, at 9 (“fitting with modern studies that 
show “people widely share intuitions about whether a given offense is more or 
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exists within a political philosophy: by introducing the “prudence” 
of the decision-maker. As Koritansky writes, “[P]rudent legislators 
(or judges) may . . . impose differing punishments according to the 
various contingencies with which they are faced.”247 More recently, 
when critiquing the difficulty with applying retributive theories of 
punishment, Chad Flanders has described how an institutional un-
derstanding of desert is warranted, focusing on who decides and how 
decisions are made.248 
But those determinations about the kind of punishment are not 
freewheeling. Rather, they remain tethered to the moral center un-
derlying the theory itself. Prudent decision-makers have liberty to 
determine the shape of punishment,249 but it cannot be shapeless, 
and the essence of punishment itself cannot be undermined. Punish-
ment must correspond to the basic function of law—promotion of 
the common good—and cannot frustrate that purpose. The kinds of 
punishment must be both functional and teleologically ordered. 
Thus, restorative retributivism has built-in constraints; but within 
those parameters, human creativity can be utilized.250 
But aren’t there limits to what human beings can know about 
culpability and the seriousness of crime? Absolutely yes, although 
modern social science has demonstrated that remarkable con-
sistency exists across cultures—and amongst laypersons—when it 
comes to calibrating punishment—an interesting validation of the 
 
less serious than another offense, but people and societies may disagree about 
what the punishment for the most serious offense will be.”); Robinson & Kurzban, 
supra note 242, at 1837–1858 (detailing studies showing remarkable consistency 
regarding rank ordering and nuance in punishment). 
 247 KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 140. 
 248 Flanders, supra note 238, at 130–31. Flanders proceeds to reference John 
Finnis’ work on determination, “a process of choosing freely from a range of rea-
sonable options none of which is simply rationally superior to the others.” See id. 
at 125 n.214 (citing Finnis, supra note 49, at 103). 
 249 See Flanders supra note 238, at 108. 
 250 Koritansky interestingly uses the metaphor of a house to describe this idea. 
See KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 141. The punishment is the house, but the 
exact shape of the house is up to human determinations. See id. But essential com-
ponents of the house, like a door, cannot be so out of bounds (like a one-foot-high 
door) that it undermines the essence of the house itself. See id. Note how similar 
this is to Professor Kleinfeld’s discussion about the fact/value distinction. Klein-
feld, supra note 16, at 1534–36. 
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teleological retributivist’s core supposition that a moral core ex-
ists.251 
That said, consistency does not necessarily mean those intuitions 
are correct, and a punishment regime in a liberal democratic order 
tends to look more to “reasoned judgments” than common intui-
tions.252 Interestingly, restorative retributivism accounts for the 
modern critic’s concern with heuristics and cognitive biases by rec-
ognizing the limits of human capabilities. The function of punish-
ment is necessarily under-determinate given moral complexity.253 In 
terms of administration, this means decision-makers strive to ascer-
tain the proper degree of punishment correlating to the order of jus-
tice that was violated.254 Interestingly, this line of thinking arguably 
made Thomas Aquinas—a Christian thinker who developed the Ar-
istotelian roots described above—cautious when it came to inflict-
ing capital punishment.255 Because there was uncertainty as to what 
justice required for such a serious crime and in particular circum-
stances, Aquinas shifted the locus of the decision to a philosophical 
discussion about public safety and imminent threats.256 James Whit-
man, in his masterful work on the theological roots of the reasonable 
doubt rule for juries, has illustrated how a similar principle advocat-
ing for choosing the safer way (when adjudicating difficult cases of 
guilt or innocence) characterized decision-making about crime and 
punishment in the pre-modern world.257 This suggests cautious 
 
 251 See Robinson & Kurzban, supra note 242, at 1831–40 (discussing layper-
sons’ intuitions of justice). 
 252 See Robinson & Darley, supra note 34, at 8 (noting how belief that wrong-
doing should be punished is intuitive rather than reasoned and how that fact has 
implications for policy questions). 
 253 See Huigens, supra note 49, at 1468 (referring to “indeterminacy of Aris-
totelian virtue”). 
 254 See Dena M. Gromet & John M. Darley, Restoration and Retribution: How 
Including Retributive Components Affects the Acceptability of Restorative Justice 
Procedures, 19 SOC. JUST. RSCH. 395, 400 (2006) (discussing social science re-
search). 
 255 See KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 160 n.160, 164–65. 
 256 See id. at 100, 164–65. 
 257 Whitman, supra note 48, at 87–90 (discussing medieval theology that sug-
gested humility in adjudication and its reemergence in late 1700s). Whitman re-
fers to trial transcripts from the 1700s to show that this way of thinking persisted. 
Id. at 87, 91; see Old Bailey Proceedings Online, 3 June 1789, Trial of John 
 
2021] RESTORATIVE RETRIBUTIVISM 891 
 
humility in human decision-making for more serious crimes, and 
perhaps for all crimes. 
This approach leaves room for mercy258 that is anathema to 
Kantian retributivism;259 restorative retributivism, recognizing the 
multifaceted nature of the good, and thereby wrongdoing, evaluates 
more than the external act itself. Moreover, there are limits to the 
capabilities of human punishment, and society would be wise to em-
phasize its medicinal character—for individuals and communities—
rather than its punitive side.260 Thus, restorative retributivism ac-
counts for the reconstructive nature of punishment, nods to humility 
in application,261 and leaves room for the modern ideal of a self-
governing, democratic, community.262 
 
Shepherd (t17890603-43), https://www.oldbaileyonline.org/browse.jsp?name=
17890603; see also Old Bailey Proceedings Online, 3 June 1789, Trial of George 
Green (t17890603-14), https://www.oldbaileyonline.org/browse.jsp?name=
17890603 (defendant was capitally punished within a month of being convicted 
of violent theft and highway robbery). To be fair, Whitman’s main argument is 
that choosing a safer path was designed to protect judges, not defendants, out of 
concern for the decision-maker’s soul. Whitman, supra note 48, at 92. Whitman 
traces this thought from Saint Augustine to the 1700s. See id. at 98. For example, 
Ambrose, when discussing whether judges should be permitted to communion in 
the Church, suggested that judges should tend towards mercy in their decision-
making. See Whitman, supra note 48, at 92 n.18 (describing influence of moral 
theology on concept of “reasonable doubt”); Albert W. Alschuler, Justice, Mercy, 
and Equality in Discretionary Criminal Justice Decision Making, 35 J. L. 
RELIGION 18, 22 (2020) (referencing how mercy can serve as an enhancement of 
“earthly justice” deemed necessary). 
 258 See Alschuler, supra note 257, at 22. 
 259 See Jeffrie G. Murphy, Punishment, Forgiveness, and Mercy, 35 J. L. 
RELIGION 5, 14 (2020) (referring to Kantian views combined with humility in 
one’s attitude while meting out punishment). 
 260 SUMMA THEOLOGICA, supra note 174, at pt. I of pt. II, question 87, art. 3. 
 261 Murphy, supra note 259, at 11 (quoting Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F. 3d 144, 
152 (7th Cir. 1995). Murphy quotes a dissenting opinion by Judge Posner that 
powerfully illustrates why humility is necessary to ensure human dignity in pun-
ishment: “We must not exaggerate the distance between ‘us,’ the lawful ones, the 
respectable ones, and the prison and jail population; for such exaggeration will 
make it too easy for us to deny that population the rudiments of humane consid-
eration.” Phelan, 69 F. 3d at 152. 
 262 See A Reply to Duff, supra note 170, at 484. 
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IV.  COMPARING RECONSTRUCTIVISM AND RESTORATIVE 
RETRIBUTIVISM 
How do these two theories of criminal law compare? It seems 
there are two possibilities: (1) restorative retributivism is actually 
reconstructivist, or (2) reconstructivism is a socio-centric version of 
this retributivism, making them relatives.263 If the latter, the com-
mon root (or parent) is a return to teleological thinking264 in punish-
ment,265 with the key distinction being the reconstructivist’s open-
ness to relativistic criminal law because of its emphasis on the social 
fabric.266 A discussion of their similarities and differences can po-
tentially illuminate the answer to the taxonomical question. 
First, each theory emphasizes that the criminal law and punish-
ment are fundamentally teleological endeavors.267 Both exist for a 
purpose, and the key question is identifying what that purpose is and 
should be. And that purpose is not exclusively tangible, such as the 
utilitarian purpose of promoting the public safety.268 The difference 
seems to lie with the source for the telos.269 Whereas the restorative 
retributivist locates purpose in metaphysical reflection on human na-
ture, moral realities built from some observation, and moral posi-
tions held in common, reconstructivism emphasizes the purely so-
cial realities, and what can be normatively deduced from empirical 
social realities.270 This enables the reconstructivist to arguably be 
more pluralistic,271 but perhaps dangerously relativistic. On the flip 
 
 263 In either instance, restorative retributivism holds that punishment was nec-
essarily connected to teleology first. See Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1533–34, 
1537. 
 264 See KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 72. 
 265 See id. at 133 (describing punishment in retributivism as a means of re-
pressing those who “rise up” against man); Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1488 (ex-
plaining that punishment “defends and reinforces” a fragile social good). 
 266 See Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1488, 1500. 
 267 See id. at 1490, 1523. 
 268 See KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 100, 102. 
 269 Kleinfeild, supra note 16, at 1490–91. 
 270 See id. at 1522–23. 
 271 Id. at 1527, 1533–34, 1536–38. It seems that reconstructivism is built from 
the idea that social facts are observable and tangible, such that the norms reified 
by the criminal law are grounded in empirical reality. See id. Of course, the idea 
that labeling facts tangible or observable makes them objective and neutral is con-
tentious. Walter B. Kennedy, Principles or Facts?, 4 FORDHAM L. REV. 53, 59 
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side, the restorative retributivist has to answer against charges of 
non-demonstrable, metaphysical principles and less flexibility in the 
joints.272 
With that said, it would be a mistake to think that both theories 
do not contain first principles based on observing the realities of hu-
man affairs.273 Reconstructivism is descriptive and normative, and 
so is restorative retributivism.274 Both theories rest on the observa-
tion that human beings are naturally social actors, which is not even 
a question, having been empirically verified for ages.275 They are 
both children of Aristotelian thought in this regard, thereby presum-
ing the reality and necessity of the integrated polis.276 Thus, both 
theories presume that crime is fundamentally anti-social and that 
punishment, as a response to crime, is pro-social and necessary to 
repair the social fabric.277 
Both recognize that the criminal law is simultaneously purpose-
ful and functional. The purpose for punishment is the same as its 
justification. The criminal law is then downstream from moral and 
social reality. But for restorative retributivism, the basis of criminal 
law is not exclusively social affairs.278 Human law represents an at-
tempt by a legitimate authority to apply morally true norms to con-
crete situations, mindful of social circumstances, and cognizant of 
the common good.279 But this theory is not as ground up as 
 
(1935). As Walter B. Kennedy once said, facts can be “just as elusive and nimble 
as principles and rules.” Id. 
 272 This might be up for debate amongst Aristotelian scholars. For example, 
my sense is that Alasdair MacIntyre argued persuasively that applying Aristote-
lian virtue ethics does not look the same in all places, such that social realities can 
alter what it means to concretely and practically live a virtuous life. See Christo-
pher Stephen Lutz, Alasdair Chalmers MacIntyre, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA 
PHIL., https://iep.utm.edu/mac-over/. This seems embedded in the Aristotelian 
conception of practical reason as the essential ingredient on the path to eudai-
monia (happiness in virtue). Ethics Explainer: Eudaimonia, supra note 56. AS 
such, restorative retributivism could fit within a liberal regime, even if it is not 
wholly of it. 
 273 Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1521–23. 
 274 Id. at 1490, 1521–23. 
 275 Id. at 1493 n.11. 
 276 Id.; HONNETH, supra note 17, at 7, 11–30. 
 277 See Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1500, 1505–06. 
 278 Id. at 1491–92. 
 279 See KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 125–26. 
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reconstructivism. The reconstructivist, on the other hand, recognizes 
law as fully downstream from culture born of freedom.280 The social 
order that the reconstructivist purports to serve with law determines 
the content of that law; it does not have other sources, which it likely 
considers too mystical to comprehend should they go beyond tangi-
ble expressions of freedom. 
Nevertheless, both theories have a rich understanding of what 
the law and punishment purport to serve.281 The reconstructivist 
points to human welfare, again tethered to socially-derived 
norms.282 The restorative retributivist looks toward a robust notion 
of the common good, which is a concept developed by thinkers for 
the past two millennia.283 The common good essentially means 
achievement of the objective human good held in common, and on 
an individual and societal level, that is necessary for human flour-
ishing.284 That is a confluence of natural law-based virtue and social 
realities,285 and it could mean different practical ends for different 
communities. But there is a moral core that derives content from 
more than social relations. That is a marked distinction from the re-
constructivist, whose moral center is determined by social reali-
ties,286 and thus, open to being relativistic across cultures. 
The moral center within both theories also allows for an under-
standing of the nature of wrongdoing (crime), which then informs 
the response (punishment).287 For the restorative retributivist, crime 
 
 280 See Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1528–29. 
 281 See id. at 1488 (explaining that punishment serves to defend and reinforce 
a fragile social good); KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 133 (describing punishment 
in retributivism as a means of repressing those who rise up against man). 
 282 See Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1526–27. 
 283 KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 125–26 (detailing Aquinas’s understanding 
that punishment serves to preserve the common good). 
 284 ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, Book 1, § 2 (c. 350 B.C.E) 
[http://classics.mit.edu//Aristotle/nicomachaen.1.i.html] (“For even if the end is 
the same for a single man and for a state, that of the state seems at all events 
something greater and more complete whether to attain or to preserve; though it 
is worthwhile to attain the end merely for one man, it is finer and more godlike to 
attain it for a nation or for city-states. These, then, are the ends at which our in-
quiry aims, since it is political science, in one sense of that term.”). 
 285 KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 109. 
 286 Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1512. 
 287 See id. at 1502. 
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is an offense against the natural moral order,288 whether automati-
cally apparent in the case of malum in se offenses,289 or in the case 
of human created crimes, an attempt to determine how that order 
applies in concrete social situations. It is also indicative of an indi-
vidual’s failure to pursue the right ends as communicated by the 
criminal law,290 in addition to subverting the social order.291 Thus, 
like reconstructivism, restorative retributivism has an understanding 
of crime that precedes the content of punishment.292 
Both theories also conceive punishment as a direct response to 
the violated order.293 This is why both theories hold that punishment 
is necessary and is one reason why reconstructivism seems to be a 
socio-centric theory of desert. It arguably is a kind of retributivism, 
particularly retributivism that contemplates crime and punishment 
as teleological endeavors. But the reason for the response is also 
why reconstructivism might be its own species of teleological pun-
ishment theory. This is because the reconstructivist’s grounds for 
punishment are fundamentally human and descriptively social;294 
they are not meta-ethical, although they might be metaphysical in 
the sense that they are intangible principles reflected in the social 
order. The difference seems to lie in the understanding of the 
grounds for desert. 
This is the crux of the taxonomical question. While the recon-
structivist conceives social affairs as dictating the terms of criminal 
law and punishment,295 does the reconstructivist think that those so-
cial affairs are entirely determined by human will? If any are socially 
given, beyond human creation, and dictated by the very nature of 
sociality, in the sense that they are connected to some natural, 
 
 288 See KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 105. 
 289 See id. at 104; Richard L. Gray, Eliminating the (Absurd) Distinction Be-
tween Malum in Se and Malum Prohibitum Crimes, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1369, 1370 
(1995). 
 290 See R.A. DUFF, THE REALM OF CRIMINAL LAW 37 (2018) (explaining that 
the “concept of the criminal law,” or what makes it distinctive, is its expression 
of community condemnation); Sandra G. Mayson, The Concept of Criminal Law, 
14 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 447, 449 (2020). 
 291 Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1529. 
 292 Id. at 1505–06. 
 293 See KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 107. 
 294 Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1498–99. 
 295 See id. at 1519, 1523. 
896 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:855 
 
metaphysical reality beyond human control, then reconstructivism 
seems to be a strand of teleological retributivism. The grounds for 
desert really are more than the social—desert is how the social re-
flects a moral order of which human freedom is a part, but not de-
terminative.296 But if the reconstructivist conceives punishment as a 
response to an attack on the exclusively human-created social sys-
tem,297 then reconstructivism operates from a different first premise: 
the idea that while human beings are naturally social, none of the 
elements of that sociality are beyond their control (or put differently, 
humans are fully free to shape social realities),298 and at the very 
least, only the ones that are observable should inform punishment.299 
This anthropological difference is crucial. 
Perhaps that makes sense because the social is more observable, 
or because autonomy is the preeminent value in liberal society. And 
in a democratic republic, empirical observation is the language of 
policy debate.300 And the social purports to make criminal law and 
punishment seem more about relationships,301 and the social fabric 
that binds us.302 But the idea that the reconstructivist more richly 
comprehends the relational nature of criminal law than the restora-
tive retributivist seems misplaced. 
Remember that reconstructivism views punishment as a re-
sponse to an attack on the social order.303 That social order is the 
idea—to use the language of Hegel—that needs “reaffirming.”304 
Restitching previously existing harmony is the objective.305 This 
sounds nothing like relationship. In fact, it sounds a lot like the 
world of concepts, and abstract ones at that. It seems like the indi-
vidual (remember how the reconstructivist shies away from the 
 
 296 See Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1525–26. 
 297 See id. 1506, 1512–13, 1525. 
 298 See id. at 1499, 1538. 
 299 This key distinction is also why reconstructivism seems closer aligned with 
liberal theories of justice that presume the social contract as the origin of society. 
See Kleinfeld, supra note 16, 1488–89. 
 300 See id. at 1553–54. 
 301 See id. at 1522–24, 1553–54. 
 302 Id. at 1500. 
 303 See id. at 1489–90, 1525–26, 1529. 
 304 Id. at 1489–90, 1529. 
 305 See id. 
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condition of the offender)306 could get lost in this framework be-
cause, after all, how the response addresses the social discord cre-
ated by the crime is what matters. The right precedes the good.307 
Couldn’t reconstructivism be just as callous to individuals as the 
Kantian retributivist in this regard?308 The reconstructivist cares 
about reaffirming maxims socially derived and normatively worthy 
of retaining.309 But what matters is the holding up of the norm, not 
the individuals involved.310 It sounds very close to the cold qualities 
of Kantian retribution that modern critics detest.311 Deontological 
duty gets replaced by solidarity (and the concept thereof), which is 
the priority.312 
In contrast, restorative retributivism, by having a notion of indi-
vidual right and wrong that informs social considerations, seems to 
be in a position where it can tailor punishments more uniquely to 
individuals.313 Kleinfeld says Kantian retributivism is offender-cen-
tric.314 That seems a bit off; rather, it seems to be offense-centric, 
focused entirely on the nature of the offense and nothing else.315 Re-
storative retributivism is actually offender and offense-centric, in 
that it discerns the individual consequences for the offender, and the 
social consequences that punishment will have for victims and the 
broader community.316 This style of retributivism is significantly 
different than reconstructivism in that it takes stock of the social, but 
does not over-prioritize it.317 It situates punishment within a broader 
 
 306 See id. at 1497–98, 1514, 1516, 1520, 1523–24, 1529, 1531. 
 307 Huigens, supra note 49, at 1436 n.43. Huigens has emphasized how this is 
the fruit of Rawlsian political philosophy informing the criminal law. Id. (noting 
how modern philosophers of the criminal law operate within a deontological and 
liberal paradigm that “seek[s] a fair arrangement of society . . . defer[ring] the 
question of the good”). 
 308 See Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1529. 
 309 Id. at 1490. 
 310 See id. 
 311 See id. at 1527. 
 312 See id. at 1527 n.119, 1546–47, 1549, 1560–61. 
 313 See id. at 1528–29. 
 314 See id. at 1527–29 (“Retributivism in the Kantian tradition is not teleolog-
ical but deontological: part of its identity consists in rejecting means-end think-
ing.”). 
 315 See id. 
 316 See id. 
 317 See id. at 1530. 
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moral framework, naturally and socially determined, that also takes 
individual goods into account.318 Restoration is the fruit of retribu-
tion tethered to the situation of the individual and the needs of the 
community.319 In contrast, the reconstructivist emphasizes the so-
cial, which could lead to some perverse results depending on the 
social framework underlying the criminal law, not to mention his-
torically-driven social realities and inequities.320 
Another way of describing this style of retributivism is that it is 
personalist.321 The criminal law and punishment thus operate to 
serve the development of persons, both individually and within the 
community.322 As Rick Garnett has mentioned, such an account em-
phasizes “character, dispositions, projects, vocation, habits, and ha-
bituation. It asks not only ‘what was done?’ or ‘what came about 
and by whom?’ but also ‘what sort of person did this?’”323 Zooming 
in on the personal—and its relation to the social—is ground for a 
 
 318 This is consistent with the idea that conceiving appropriate desert is possi-
ble and not altogether mystical. See Robinson & Kurzban, supra note 242, at 
1835; Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1508, 1526; see also JOHN KLEINIG, 
PUNISHMENT AND DESERT 114 (1973) (“What follows from [attempts to exactly 
define desert] is not the absurdity of specific desert claims but only the absurdity 
of expecting them to function like statements of empirical quantity.”). “Ordinal 
ranking” is feasible once an endpoint for the most serious offense is determined. 
Robinson & Darley, supra note 34, at 34 (“[O]nce a society sets the endpoint of 
its punishment continuum, the ordinal ranking of cases along that continuum will 
produce quite specific punishments.”). 
 319 Interestingly, R.A. Duff has lauded this type of restorative justice achieved 
via retribution. R.A. Duff, Restorative Punishment and Punitive Restoration, in 
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND THE LAW 82 (Lode Walgrave ed., 2002) (“Our re-
sponses to crime should aim for ‘restoration’, for ‘restorative justice’: but the kind 
of restoration that criminal wrongdoing makes necessary is properly achieved 
through a process of retributive punishment.” (emphasis added)). 
 320 Another way of thinking about this is as follows: the restorative retributiv-
ist has an argument against egregious systems of criminal law that stem from 
egregious social practices and norms. See Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1547, 1550. 
The reconstructivist has a harder time responding to that situation, which is why 
it seems Professor Kleinfeld concedes that retributivist constraints might be nec-
essary to rein in reconstructivism in social circumstances. Id. at 1529 n.122. 
 321 SMITH, supra note 42, at 406–08. 
 322 See id.; Huigens critiques instrumental explanations that fail to view a per-
son as “a full moral agent, with her own scheme of ends, her own talents and 
abilities, her own strengths of character, and so on.” Huigens, supra note 49, at 
1438. 
 323 Garnett, supra note 160, at 239. 
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richer notion of the meaning of punishment and its aiming towards 
flourishing, leading to criminal law that serves and restores rather 
than imposes and inflicts.324 
V. RESTORATIVE RETRIBUTIVISM AND THE CURRENT CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM 
If restorative retribution is an alternative to reconstructivism, or 
other theories of punishment, its application to modern problems of 
criminal justice is a test of its viability. The above sections com-
municate that this theory’s core is about purpose.325 In particular, 
the purpose behind punishment is connected to human flourishing: 
without that tethering, punishment can become reckless, degrading, 
other-creating, and undermine itself.326 This, I propose, is why re-
storative retributivism is fundamentally personalist and relational: 
the social nature of punishment—its effects on the broader commu-
nity and the punished individual’s ability to rejoin that commu-
nity—is of the utmost concern.327 The purpose of punishment can 
simultaneously be appropriate retribution and preparation for rein-
tegration when the development of individual and social well-being 
underlies the entire project.328 As Bill Stuntz put it, punishment can 
 
 324 See SMITH, supra note 42, at 406–08; Flanders, supra note 238, at 87 (as-
sessing the connection between punishment theory and practice). Of course, there 
can be a disconnect between an aspiration or ideal and practice. See Flanders, 
supra note 238, at 87. 
 325 Supra Parts I–IV. 
 326 See Murphy, supra note 259, at 15. 
 327 Skotnicki, supra note 49, at 799 (referencing historical Church teaching as 
suggesting that “rehabilitation of the offender and his or her eventual reincorpo-
ration into the ecclesial social body is the goal of punishment”). 
 328 Winston Churchill, Home Secretary, Speech Delivered to House of Com-
mons (July 20, 1910), in WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, HIS COMPLETE SPEECHES: 
1897-1963, VOLUME II: 1908–13, at 1598 (Robert Rhodes James ed., 1974) (“The 
mood and temper of the public in regard to the treatment of crime and criminals 
is one of the most unfailing tests of the civilization of any country . . . [This civi-
lized attitude includes] unfaltering faith that there is a treasure, if you can only 
find it, in the heart of every man.”). 
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be viewed as “sometimes necessary but always [potentially] danger-
ous,” demanding caution when exercised.329 
This results in a key similarity with reconstructivism and a key 
difference that matters in terms of application. Whereas both theo-
ries—given their concern with the social fabric—are inherently 
democratic, reconstructivism tends towards instillation (or re-instal-
lation) of custom.330 Deference is shown to the way the things are or 
have been. For the reconstructivist, this is a great benefit because, in 
the words of Kleinfeld, it is Burkean.331 Radical change is not the 
work of the criminal law. Criminal justice reform is therefore likely 
to be piecemeal, the work of “supermajorities rather than simple ma-
jorities”, and the reconstructivist is “skeptical of projects in social 
reform by means of the criminal law.”332 
Restorative retributivism, by contrast, seems to have the capac-
ity—perhaps paradoxically given its historical roots—to be more 
countercultural in the current moment. By its nature, reflective on 
human nature, it goes to first principles rather than first practices.333 
That is because its core invites a moral reflection that goes beyond 
social realities.334 Its nestling inside a broader theory of law—again 
mindful of telos and the common good (that goes beyond public 
safety)335—and its connection to the idea of virtue and flourishing336 
suggests the criminal law has the capacity to affect social reform, 
while not being the primary catalyst. Perhaps it is accurate to say 
that the restorative retributivist believes there is more that the 
 
 329 STUNTZ, supra note 2, at 55; see also Murphy, supra note 259, at 15 (noting 
how humility “will incline those who would punish to see this not as something 
to be celebrated but as something to be done with great regret and always with a 
sense of loss and disappointment, always open to the possibility that the offender 
has failed us because to some degree we have failed him.”). Whitman makes a 
similar point about pre-modern approaches to criminal law and punishment, 
where the awesome spectacle of punishment was viewed as necessary but also an 
expression of sorrow in the community. Whitman, supra note 48, at 84–85. 
 330 Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1552 (“[I]t follows that criminal law must 
begin in custom and maintain its connection to custom.”). 
 331 Id. at 1555. 
 332 Id. 
 333 See Flanders, supra note 238, at 97–98. 
 334 Id. at 103–04. 
 335 See KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 100, 102; Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 
1549, 1556–57. 
 336 See Kleinfeld, supra note 16, 1493–94, 1532. 
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criminal law can do—not in terms of more criminalization—but in 
the sense that the criminal law, as it currently operates, leaves much 
to be desired.337 
Thus, the core contribution of the restorative retributivist in this 
moment is that she demands an accounting of what our system does, 
why it does it, and whether it accords with a robust and deep sense 
of human flourishing rather than a thin one focused exclusively on 
quantifying crime rates, the costs of jail time, and how to engage in 
social control en masse.338 That is ambitious, aspirational, and reor-
ienting.339 But it also comes with a dose of humility about the project 
of the criminal law, such that the criminal law and punishment do 
not become the antidote to social ills better addressed by other sys-
tems of law or private actors. 
What does this mean for some of the current issues facing the 
criminal justice system, such as mass criminalization and incarcera-
tion, the encroachment of the criminal law onto the civil law, the 
conflict between punitive and therapeutic interventions for sub-
stance users,340 plea-bargaining and the decline of the jury trial,341 
recidivism,342 the social consequences of incarceration on fami-
lies343 and communities, and the effect of public criminal records on 
reentry?344 While a full accounting is beyond the scope of this arti-
cle, it is worth mentioning some of the questions that a restorative 
retributivist might ask when confronted with modern day criminal 
practices. 
Given its Aristotelian roots, it is likely the case that this line of 
thought would find the significant enlargement of the criminal 
 
 337 See STUNTZ, supra note 2, at 55 (discussing pathological politics of crimi-
nal law). 
 338 See Stephanos Bibas, Forgiveness in Criminal Procedure, 4 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 329, 329 (2007). 
 339 See Flanders, supra note 238, at 104, 110–11. 
 340 See Murphy, supra note 259, at 16 (describing punishment as a last resort 
to deal with drug problems). 
 341 Gramlich, supra note 2. 
 342 Recidivism, NAT’L INST. JUST., https://nij.ojp.gov/topics/corrections/recid-
ivism (last visited May 15, 2021). 
 343 Eric Martin, Hidden Consequences: The Impact of Incarceration on De-
pendent Children, NAT’L INST. JUST., May 2017, at 1–3. 
 344 Re-Entry, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/smart-justice/re-entry (last 
visited May 15, 2021). 
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law—and corresponding sentences in the wake of conviction—a bit 
puzzling.345 For an Aristotelian is primarily concerned with the ha-
bituation of virtue, not social control.346 Whether the three felonies 
that many Americans potentially commit every day under the fed-
eral code347 have any connection to the development of virtuous 
character is a legitimate question. The core of criminal law once 
communicated the behaviors most thought deserving of punishment; 
the norm today is an overbroad criminal law that makes convictions 
easy to achieve via plea bargain.348 In addition to the heightened se-
verity of punishment, its frequency is off the charts as a break from 
American history,349 and the incarceration of racial minorities is as-
tronomical.350 
That is not to say that this theory only conceives of a criminal 
law with malum in se prohibitions; rather, it asks whether the crim-
inalization of a particular behavior really does get at the core of who 
we are, and what is necessary for people to develop right habits and 
good character. That is not to encourage lawbreaking. Certainly, the 
breaking of “minor” laws is disruptive to the law overall. Rather, it 
is to encourage serious consideration about where the criminal law 
should stop, and where other behavior-shaping forces make more 
sense. 
It also would probably view the modern criminal law’s practice 
of letting most charges originate with a few discretionary decisions 
by insiders as problematic. Because of its cognizance of the social 
elements of the criminal law and punishment, the very acts of the 
state associated with enforcement of the criminal law should be so-
cial.351 Jury trials were initially conceived as opportunities for the 
exercise of moral responsibility by the community,352 but now are 
relegated to the sidelines as most cases are adjudicated via plea-
 
 345 See A Reply to Duff, supra note 170, at 468. 
 346 Id. 
 347 HARVEY SILVERGATE, THREE FELONIES A DAY: HOW THE FEDS TARGET 
THE INNOCENT (2011). 
 348 STUNTZ, supra note 2, at 39. 
 349 See id. at 47-50 (noting how frequency of punishment is astronomical, even 
if drug cases are removed from the statistics). 
 350 Id. 
 351 Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1522. 
 352 WHITMAN, supra note 48, at 146 (“[J]ury trial was the scene of complex 
drama of moral responsibility.”). 
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bargaining.353 As such, they were a check on the defendant, im-
pulses of the community, and professional prosecutors.354 Wide-
spread charging by information, without any sort of normative check 
by the community, makes that more difficult.355 
While restorative retributivism has a goal in mind for punish-
ment, it leaves open the mode for accomplishing that goal. Again, it 
operates from the standpoint that punishment is necessary but easily 
abused.356 This is one manifestation of its fixed yet flexible nature: 
parameters and considerations are present, as is wiggle room in the 
joints. When the boundaries are clear, creativity (consonant with 
dignity) can flourish.357 The under-determinate nature of law leaves 
room for human discretion and decision-making, reflective of how 
a form of punishment accords with the underlying restorative pur-
pose of punishment. It also is open to critically assessing the “Amer-
ican tendency to deal with crime simply by adding more years on to 
oppressive mandatory sentences . . . .”358 
This, of course, is not easy work. Tailoring punishment lends 
itself neither to mathematical formula nor natural instinct. Rather, it 
requires practical reason and a dose of humility that does not aim to 
be too ambitious. As Koritansky puts it, “[T]o inflict a punishment 
that hinders the basic function of human law or frustrates the pur-
poses of the institution of punishment itself would constitute a vio-
lation of the natural law the same as having no institution of punish-
ment at all.”359 Human-designed punishment should redress disor-
der, communicate what is right and good,360 and aim to make people 
and institutions better. That is what makes this form of retributivism 
 
 353 Laura I. Appleman, The Plea Jury, 85 IND. L.J. 731, 733–35 (2010) (dis-
cussing history of jury trial, Sixth Amendment right, and how its reemergence 
could disrupt plea-bargaining norms). 
 354 Id. 
 355 See Josh Bowers, The Normative Case for Normative Grand Juries, 47 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 319, 358 (2012) (detailing how modern system addresses 
lower-level crimes with little community involvement). 
 356 Flanders, supra note 238, at 128–29. 
 357 See Kleinfeld, supra note 16, 1508. 
 358 Murphy, supra note 259, at 15. 
 359 KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 141 (emphasis added). 
 360 Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, 49 MONIST 397, 
402 (1965) (communicating very well, perhaps better than those who fall into the 
restorative retributivism camp, that “punishment has a symbolic significance.”). 
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restorative rather than control-based.361 It is participative, personal, 
and open to forgiveness.362 Punishment solely for the purpose of 
promoting public safety,363 or to be cost-efficient,364 is inadequate 
to the name because it misreads the human condition. It not only 
sells the individual short;365 it deprives society of a possible partici-
pant in the common good in the long run.366 Ensuring peace, im-
proving individuals, and improving the community are symbiotic 
goals.367 Punishment is not about settling scores between offender 
and victim; rather, it is about the relationship between the offender 
and the broader community of which she was, is, and will continue 
to be a part.368 It is reparative369 and retributive. A knee-jerk, default 
policy of incarceration is too overbroad, wreaks devastating conse-
quences on communities,370 and undermines the entire purpose of 
the criminal law. This is especially true in a democratic society that 
disproportionately incarcerates certain groups.371 
Where does humility come into play? Given the epistemic diffi-
culty in knowing, with absolute certainty, the quantity of desert 
 
 361 See Bibas, supra note 338, at 342. 
 362 See id. at 329 (noting how current system expends “little effort to under-
stand, heal, or reform offenders”). 
 363 See KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 100. 
 364 See Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1496, 1532. 
 365 This is because the theory holds that the criminal activity giving rise to 
punishment was not only anti-social, but anti-individual, in the sense that the per-
son has harmed him or herself. See id. at 1505–06, 1512. 
 366 See Murphy, supra note 259, at 14. 
 367 KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 142. Augustine said punishment is “for his 
own good, to readjust him to the peace he has abandoned.” Saint Augustine, The 
City of God, Book XIX, in THE FATHERS OF THE CHURCH 225, 225–26 (Gerald G. 
Walsh & Daniel J. Honan trans., 1954). 
 368 Skotnicki, supra note 49, at 802 (referencing how pre-modern theories of 
punishment conceived offenders as still part of the community, as “members of 
the ‘body’ in an organic sense”). 
 369 Id. at 132 (“[T]he truest reparation is to be reacquainted with one’s best 
self.”). Skotnicki argues that this version of retributivism is liberating and pro-
vides the ground for the development of restorative justice procedures. See id. He 
cites Brathwaite for this idea. Id. at 132 n.22, 33 (citing JOHN BRAITHWAITE, 
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND RESPONSIVE REGULATION 5 (2002) (noting how the 
Catholic Church’s confessional rites are restorative justice)). 
 370 The effects of parental incarceration on children, for instance, comes to 
mind. Martin, supra note 343, at 1–3. 
 371 STUNTZ, supra note 2, at 13. 
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demanded by a particular situation, decision-makers should strive 
for punishment calibrated to culpability and the circumstances of the 
offender. Jeffrie Murphy refers to this as the virtue of “attention.”372 
Paying careful attention to detail about culpability and social cir-
cumstances can breed humility about what is deserved because an 
“attempt to see in a good light what appear to be a person’s bad 
qualities . . . is an important kind of humility.”373 It also will likely 
lead to revelations about luck and its effect on the plight of someone 
encountering the system, undermining righteousness and self-de-
ception in those who hand out punishments.374 
Humility of this sort permits erring on the side of under-punish-
ment because, as mentioned above, the catastrophic costs of over-
punishment are worth avoiding lest punishment’s utility be com-
pletely undermined.375 If punishment is meant to be reparative, risk-
ing additional disruption to society, the community, and the offender 
through over-punishment is a serious concern.376 That suggests that 
absolute confidence in the justice of the death penalty, mandatory 
minimums for drug offenders, lifetime collateral consequences, or 
other well-known harsh penalties that are ultimately criminogenic 
and breed recidivism probably is a step in the wrong direction.377 
That could conflict with deference to strict democratic principles or 
the total democratization of the criminal law.378 But the restorative 
 
 372 See Jeffrie G. Murphy, Humility as a Moral Virtue, in HANDBOOK OF 
HUMILITY: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND APPLICATIONS 19, 22–23 (Everett L. 
Worthington, Jr., Don E. Davis, & Joshua N. Hook, eds., 2017). 
 373 Id. 
 374 See id. at 24 (discussing how “it is all too common for those who have not 
done certain wrongs to feel an unjustified certainty that they are righteous and 
thus can hold in utter contempt those who have fallen”). 
 375 See id. at 30. 
 376 Bibas, supra note 338, at 338 (“So long as the punishment imposed is suf-
ficient to deter, incapacitate, educate, and condemn the seriousness of the crime, 
the state’s interests are satisfied. Any margin of punishment above that needed to 
fulfill those goals should be the victim’s to forgive.”). 
 377 See id. at 339. 
 378 See STUNTZ, supra note 2, at 4–5 (discussing how “[d]iscretion and dis-
crimination travel together”). 
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retributivist is a friend to constrained discretion mindful of broader 
purposes, accompanied by realistic humility.379 
David Garland has persuasively articulated how penal institu-
tions transformed into instruments of aggravated social control ra-
ther than institutions with environments built to help individuals get 
better.380 Criminal justice has become impersonal; but that conflicts 
with moral intuitions because “crime has a human face,” and the 
system should reflect it.381 The meaning of imprisonment in the mid 
to late twentieth century changed.382 If imprisonment is the mode by 
which disorder from crime will be addressed (and there is no reason 
to think that it won’t be, at least for the time being),383 then the pur-
pose of the prison is worth thinking about. Its historical origin—
connected to penitentiaries and similar institutions focused on re-
pair,384 rather than controlling the dangerous like cogs in machin-
ery385—suggest revitalization of the environment within prisons is 
sorely in order. But that probably requires a different sort of anthro-
pology or basic understanding of the human condition. As Fyodor 
Dostoevsky said, “the degree of civilization in a society can be 
judged by entering its prisons.”386 
 
 379 STUNTZ, supra note 2, at 5 (noting how American criminal justice became 
too deferential to official discretion, ultimately permitting unequal application of 
the laws to particular communities, resulting in discriminatory law enforcement). 
 380 DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL 15–19 (2002). 
 381 Bibas, supra note 338, at 337 (“Crime has a human face, and that face de-
serves standing and a say in the matter.”). 
 382 See STUNTZ, supra note 2, at 32–35 (explaining surge in imprisonment and 
consequences of criminal punishment). 
 383 Of course, scholars have been arguing for prison abolition for a long time, 
and the movement seems to be gaining some traction. See Amna A. Akbar, How 
Defund and Disband Became the Demands, N.Y. REV. (June 15, 2020), 
https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2020/06/15/how-defund-and-disband-became-
the-demands/. 
 384 Skotnicki, supra note 49, at 806 (referencing how prison was an alternative 
to “cruel forms of justice that often marked life in secular polities”). 
 385 See BIBAS, supra note 4, at 1, 14–15. 
 386 Ilya Vinitsky, Dostoyevsky Misprisioned: “The House of the Dead” and 
American Prison Literature, L.A. REV. BOOKS (Dec. 23, 2021), https://lare-
viewofbooks.org/article/dostoyevsky-misprisioned-the-house-of-the-dead-and-
american-prison-literature/ (noting that “Dostoyevsky’s ‘famous words’ on pris-
ons and civilization are still very much alive”); see also Larissa Pahomov, Build-
ing a Collective Understanding of Prisons, 102 ENGLISH J. 38, 38–39, 42 (2013) 
(examining and criticizing “common attitudes toward prisoners”). 
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The restorative retributivist would replace the language of 
“risk”—pervasive in discussions of the criminal law these days and 
undoubtedly conducive to the “other-ing” of offenders—with 
“worth.”387 The same analysis could apply to the notion that diver-
sionary programs are always good for offenders, when in reality 
they have the capacity to perpetuate if not enhance control.388 In 
short, do we primarily understand human beings negatively as risk 
creators or positively as capable of good?389 
It would seem that restorative retributivism leaves room for the 
empowerment of victims, but not in an unconstrained way. Jean 
Hampton has articulated how the criminal law validates the plight 
of victims.390 Because restorative retributivism is cognizant of the 
individual offender’s well-being and the common good, it leaves 
room for practices that involve victim forgiveness.391 Giving a vic-
tim “the power to forgive”—and thereby constrain the state so that 
it does not overpunish—helps to rectify any “power imbalance” 
 
 387 See Skotnicki, supra note 49, at 814 (citing Malcolm M. Feeley & Jonathan 
Simon, The New Penology: Notes on the Emerging Strategy of Corrections and 
Its Implications, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 449, 457, 468 (1992)). This is because the Ar-
istotelian tradition prioritizes the development of character, not mitigating poten-
tial bad acts. See ROSALIND HURSTHOUSE, ON VIRTUE ETHICS 29–32 (2001). 
 388 E. Lea Johnston & Conor P. Flynn, Mental Health Courts and Sentencing 
Disparities, 62 VILL. L. REV. 685, 693 (2017) (unpublished manuscript) (finding 
that mental health court sentences were significantly longer than potential punish-
ments); see Collins, supra note 7, at 1581, 1591, 1603; see also Skotnicki, supra 
note 49, at 815 (“[T]he architects of social control have utilized many of the ele-
ments of the decarceration movement such as drug-testing, electronic monitoring, 
and intensive probation as surveillance mechanisms . . . .”). 
 389 This is admittedly very different from a systems, actuarial, or management 
approach to the issues within criminal justice. Skotnicki, supra note 49, at 814 
(referencing a “systems management approach that ‘aggregates’ the individual, 
understanding him or her solely as a member of a group, uncoupled from social 
history and subjective interpretations, and defined in terms of risk”) (citing Feeley 
& Simon, supra note 387 at 457, 468); see also Murphy, supra note 259, at 15 
(referencing how prisons should be an environment that will be “truly rehabilita-
tive and will provide opportunities for people to become better”). 
 390 See MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 15, at 36–42 (discussing proper def-
inition of forgiveness). 
 391 See id. 
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created by the initial crime.392 Some studies also suggest it has a 
secondary effect of limiting recidivism.393 
Given the Aristotelian focus on the local polis, restorative retrib-
utivism would prioritize local governance when it comes to the 
criminal law, but again with the objective moral constraints under-
lying the theory.394 Stuntz, in The Collapse of American Criminal 
Justice, demonstrated how the historically intended local admin-
istration of the criminal justice system has been replaced by a dis-
junctive political situation where the voters electing officials have 
little experience with crime in their own communities.395 This un-
dermines the credibility of the justice system and likely exacerbates 
racial disparities in policing and the experiences of individuals in-
teracting with the criminal justice system.396 Locally minded, dem-
ocratic, and relational criminal justice can be more lenient and less 
discriminatory than centralized and bureaucratized criminal jus-
tice.397 As Stuntz put it, 
Anyone who has been the victim of a serious crime 
knows the desire to see perpetrators punished that 
seems to be part of our nature. At the same time, all 
those who have seen neighbors’ sons behind bars, or 
their own, know the agony incarceration imposes on 
local communities. Local political control over 
 
 392 Id.; Bibas, supra note 338, at 338 (citing Edna Erez, Who’s Afraid of the 
Big Bad Victim? Victim Impact Statements as Victim Empowerment and Enhance-
ment of Justice, 1999 CRIM. L. REV. 545, 550-53 (1999)). 
 393 William R. Nugent et al., Participation in Victim-Offender Mediation and 
the Prevalence and Severity of Subsequent Delinquent Behavior: A Meta-Analy-
sis, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 137, 140, 162 (2003) (meta-analysis finding possibility of 
reduction in reoffending). 
 394 See Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1493 n.11; HONNETH, supra note 17, at 7, 
11–30. 
 395 STUNTZ, supra note 2, at 21 (describing how suburban voters elect officials 
who make decisions for communities most affected by crime). “[V]oters in safe 
places elect the officials who shape criminal justice in dangerous ones.” Id. 
 396 Id. at 21–22. 
 397 See id. at 31 (referencing history of local administration of justice that, 
while imperfect, was more personal, lenient, and democratic, and less discrimina-
tory). 
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criminal justice harnesses both forces without giving 
precedence to either.398 
Placing power to make decisions in the hands of those most affected 
by the falling and rising rates of crime can reduce agency costs and 
empower individuals to do what is good for their particular commu-
nity.399 At the same time, that discretion, totally unconstrained, can 
be easily manipulated, leading to perverse results.400 
What about treatment of those who have been convicted after 
they have served their sentences? In other words, does this theory of 
retribution have anything to offer to those suffering under the weight 
of collateral consequences or permanent damage to their reputa-
tions? The answer would seem to be yes. Because of its relational 
core, how a wrongdoer is perceived after encountering the system 
must account for the complicated web of relationships central to that 
person’s well-being. Rachel Barkow has written about how percep-
tions of convicted individuals after punishment differ significantly 
from perceptions before trial.401 That empirical reality jives nicely 
with the reintegrative aspirations of this theory, again designed to 
improve the situation of the offender through and after punishment, 
meaning punishment must end. As others have remarked, “contin-
ued [governmental] publicity is simply punishment without end.”402 
CONCLUSION 
The goal of this Article is to situate reconstructivism next to an 
older theory of retributivism. Where reconstructivism lands taxo-
nomically really depends on how the reconstructivist understands 
social relations. If they are truly human constituted, and not given at 
all, then reconstructivism is not a theory of retributive desert. But if 
they are informed by moral realities, then the social is really just part 
of the moral; and restorative retributivism has already accounted for 
that, in both its purpose and function for criminal law and 
 
 398 Id. at 36. 
 399 Id. at 39 (“Make criminal justice more locally democratic, and justice will 
be more moderate, more egalitarian, and more effective at controlling crime.”). 
 400 See id. at 5. 
 401 Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715, 750–51 
(2005). 
 402 Bibas, supra note 338, at 343. 
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punishment. Reconstructivism thus becomes a socio-centric version 
of restorative retributivism. 
Does this taxonomical question have a bearing on policy ques-
tions? Perhaps, and they would need to be worked out in concrete 
detail. But the better position seems to me to be that both theories 
have a lot more to offer public policy debates than those operating 
solely along utilitarian lines. Losing the concept of a telos—whether 
individual or socially defined—is one reason why the trains have 
run off the tracks when it comes to criminal law and punishment. 
The reconstructivist rightly emphasizes the social, reminding 
those tasked with the criminal law and punishment to keep in mind 
how both institutions relate to the social fabric. And the restorative 
retributivist brings necessary reflection on the normative—beyond 
human constructed social affairs—that makes the criminal law per-
sonalist rather than abstract. These are considerations any just sys-
tem of criminal law should wrestle with when it comes to any policy 
decision because they go to the very nature of living in a community. 
Lay intuitions of justice conflict with the wave of American criminal 
justice politics that has led to incapacitation run amok.403 And they 
underlie the public’s desire for real, personal justice from the crim-
inal justice system. In short, whether siblings, cousins, or just distant 
relatives, reconstructivism and restorative retributivism can be part-
ners in restoring the expressive aspects of the criminal law, helping 
to re-stitch the social fabric,404 and contributing to human flourish-
ing. As both teach us, a criminal law that does not pursue those goals 
is a criminal law without a purpose. 
 
 403 Robinson & Darley, supra note 34, at 41 (noting how empirical desert in-
forms common intuitions). 
 404 Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1500. 
